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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. R ISK  EXPOSURE TO NATURAL HAZARDS AND DATA QUALITY
Jamaica, as a result o f  its location in the north-western Caribbean basin, is prone to numerous 
specific natural hazards. These include hurricanes, o f  which recent hurricanes experienced within 
the last few years (and in fact since 1988 with hurricane Gilbert), have reminded us o f  Jamaica's 
great vulnerability to the effects o f  this hazard. Next, it is also envisaged that a large earthquake 
could do considerable damage to sectors o f  the population and to infrastructure and could result 
in displacement and homelessness among large sections o f the population, particularly in the 
highly urbanized areas o f the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA). These two hazards, though 
perhaps not the most frequent, have the potential to do the most widespread damage to the 
population and to infrastructure. Floods are the most frequently occurring natural hazard in 
Jamaica, and are often linked with severe weather systems, frontal systems and troughs, and less 
often with hurricanes and storms. Next to floods, landslides are the most frequently occurring 
hazard for Jamaica. Tsunami events appear to be very infrequent around the coastline o f  Jamaica. 
Events have been recorded however, in 1755 and more recently in 1907.
In all, over 300,000 references on the general topic o f  disaster risk were found to exist. It 
is therefore clear that there is abundant data dealing with this issue. Largely due to the fact that 
these documents have been produced through research initiatives, or as commissioned studies, 
the quality o f  the data appears to be quite rich. With respect to the accessibility o f  these data, in 
the Jamaican context the central storage locations are primarily at ODPEM and at CARDIN.
Among technical agencies, access to data and information is reasonably easy. The Land 
Information Council o f  Jamaica coordinates data access and sharing for the Government agencies 
with Geographic Information Systems. Some private companies also share data with the ODPEM 
at no cost. Access to information by the public has been more difficult, although the use o f  
websites to disseminate information to the public is becoming more popular. ODPEM 
disseminates information for its public information and awareness program through its website, 
schools, libraries, public lectures and workshops. The public is guaranteed the right to all but 
personal information by the Access to Information Act.
The awareness o f  the public to floods is evident, as they are described in much detail after 
each occurrence in the visual and written media. In recent years a trend has been evident in which 
victims o f  flooding have either requested relocation or have agreed to relocation. It is clear that 
these residents have developed a full perception o f this hazard, its possible effect (vulnerability) 
and the degree o f loss likely to be experienced in the future and have decided not to accept the 
level o f  risk involved in remaining at the vulnerable location. From the perspective o f  hurricanes, 
hurricane Gilbert in 1988 and Ivan in 2004 have done much to sensitize the populace about the 
risks and vulnerabilities associated with this hazard. The threat o f  earthquakes, which has held a 
less prominent position in the public consciousness, has been boosted through the holding o f  
simulation exercises that have been portrayed in the media.
2B. THE RISK  MANAGEM ENT STRUCTURE
The management o f  ex ante and some ex post emergency planning issues is overseen primarily by 
the Office o f  Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM). ODPEM’s mandate 
covers more than disaster response, and includes preparedness, response, mitigation, prevention 
and recovery. Each parish has a Parish Disaster Committee including Government, Private Sector 
and NGO representatives. The national system o f sub— committees is mirrored at the parish 
level. Below the parish level, some communities also have disaster committees called Zonal 
Committees, which link with the Parish Disaster Committees.
There are a number o f functional plans for evacuation, communication, mass casualty 
events, aircraft accidents, pandemics, pest infestations, etc. O f these, the primary plan is the 
National Disaster Plan, which is a comprehensive document setting out mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery procedures for a variety o f  hazards, both natural and man— induced. 
ODPEM is responsible for coordinating the response to national threats and emergencies, with 
coordination being carried out from the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC). Under 
the post— impact conditions, ODPEM also coordinates the relief efforts, which also incorporates 
the input o f  the international community. There are standing procedures which govern 
rehabilitation o f  critical services. For example, hospitals receive priority attention for road 
clearance and reconnection o f power and water supplies after any disaster. Shelters are also given 
a high priority.
The existence o f  documented policies, plans and procedures at national and parish levels 
has allowed a consistent approach to response. Further, simulation exercises and real events have 
provided opportunities for testing and improvement o f  the system. The present governance 
structures therefore allow risk management to be incorporated at local levels, with Parish 
Councils being given more technical tools, such as hazard maps and risk analyses to guide them 
in their decision— making.
The integrated nature o f  the Jamaican risk management system encourages data and 
information exchange among agencies as well as decision— makers. In the past, the appreciation 
by the technical agencies o f Government o f the importance o f risk reduction has not been 
matched at the policy and political level. More recently, however, and particularly after hurricane 
Ivan in 2004, there has been a marked increase in the acceptance o f  issues related to vulnerability 
reduction and mitigation. As an example, the Planning Institute o f  Jamaica has included risk 
reduction in its medium term development strategy plan, and Cabinet has agreed to various 
suggestions for reducing coastal vulnerability.
Jamaica has successfully integrated public, private, technical, scientific and voluntary 
sectors as well as local Government authorities and communities into its disaster risk 
management structure, and therefore represents a good example o f an integrated approach to risk 
management. The inclusion o f mitigation in the national medium term development plan also 
indicates that there is a real effort to integrate risk reduction into national development.
3C. RISK  FINANCING AND RISK  TRANSFER
The Government o f  Jamaica does not have a policy o f  Risk Transfer and so, Government assets 
are largely uninsured. This culture is however changing, as many Statutory Bodies and Executive 
Agencies do insure their property. The fact remains however that as a policy, the Government 
assumes its own risk. This policy results in the reallocation o f funding from ongoing programs to 
fund response initiates. In 1989, after hurricane Gilbert, a National Disaster Fund was started; 
however this has not been adequately maintained. For the most part, Government physical assets 
are uninsured or underinsured. Exceptions include properties owned by statutory corporations 
such as port and airport authorities, as well as utility companies that can independently access the 
insurance markets.
As part o f  a historical strategy to address the financial and economic impact o f  risks from 
natural disasters, Jamaica has (as has many other Caribbean islands) successfully leveraged 
international insurance capital and has been able to transfer much o f the risk, particularly for 
commercial, but also for residential properties, on to the international insurance and reinsurance 
markets. During the mid 1990’s, Caribbean countries experienced insurance rate increases 
between 200%— 300% on account o f  shortages o f  insurance cover, due to indemnity payments 
made for large hurricane and earthquake losses worldwide.
Many o f the small property and business owner segments expect Government assistance 
in times o f  crisis. Others decide to self— insure, assuming that the returns on funds saved from 
insurance premiums may be sufficient to finance remediation works. In most cases however, this 
does not work, as the savings are absorbed into working capital.
D. SCENARIOS OF EXTREM E EVENTS
Two extreme event scenarios are discussed in the main report. The first was a Category 5 hurricane 
(wind speeds above 155 mph) approaching from the south— east, and the second a Magnitude 7 
earthquake with epicentre in the Wag Water Belt area.
The scenario hurricane could be expected to have a significant impact on the entire 
population o f Jamaica, but more so for the residents and infrastructure along the south coast. All 
urban centres would be expected to be at risk, but particularly the KMA region. It is to be expected 
that the scenario hurricane could result in a tally o f homeless individuals somewhere in the order o f  
20,000 -  30,000. The emergency network would therefore have to gear up to accommodate these 
numbers in shelter locations. The immediate coastline areas o f St Thomas, Kingston, St Catherine 
and Clarendon would likely have to be evacuated. Storm surge hazard maps indicate that the 
coastal strip o f Kingston would be inundated, as would the access road to the international airport. 
This coastal strip includes many inner— city communities, which are vulnerable, as they do not 
have updated infrastructure that is capable o f  withstanding a natural disaster o f this magnitude. 
Sections o f the Portmore area, which itself is perhaps the most densely populated area located on 
the south coast o f Jamaica exposed to this hazard, would have to be evacuated. The provision o f an 
adequate number o f shelters is expected to pose some challenges, as there is presently a lack o f
4adequately trained individuals to satisfy this requirement. It is unlikely that this extreme event 
would be able to destroy the entire country to the same degree. In real events so far, there have 
therefore been options for relocating resources from less damaged to more damaged areas, until 
external assistance has become available.
Unlike hurricanes, the possible effects o f  earthquakes are more o f  an unknown. Major 
structures in New Kingston and Downtown are likely to survive such an event, although minor 
structural damage is a distinct possibility. Geological conditions at our major ports also make them 
more vulnerable to significant damage. The provision o f water will be a major problem. Disruption 
of sewage lines will also likely occur, posing possible threats to health and causing contamination 
of piped water where these systems survive and may be adjacent to one another. The secondary 
effects o f an earthquake have implications which also need to be considered. Disturbance o f the 
harbor could mean that ships would not be able to enter until the channel had been surveyed and 
re— established. The container port is located on reclaimed landfill, which could be prone to 
liquefaction under earthquake loading. Extensive damage to the Norman Manley International 
Airport would leave Montego Bay's Sangster International Airport as the only port o f  entry for 
relief supplies coming in by air. Interestingly, a recent earthquake simulation exercise carried out 
by the ODPEM on the 100th anniversary o f the 1907 earthquake, revealed several weaknesses in the 
response mechanisms and in particular in the search and rescue capabilities.
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6I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1. General Objectives
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has, 
over the last thirty years, implemented a methodology aimed at assessing the social, economic 
and environmental impact o f  disasters.
More recently, ECLAC, with IDB support, has initiated a technical cooperation project 
entitled Inform ation Program for Disaster Risk M anagement, whose objective is to provide 
decision makers in Latin America and the Caribbean with the necessary tools to develop and 
implement risk management strategies.
The specific objectives o f  this project are summarized as:
a) Improving the availability and use o f risk information so as to better identify 
investment priorities in prevention, and in guiding the post-disaster recovery 
process.
b) Providing policy-makers with a method o f evaluating the ability o f  their countries 
to reduce their vulnerability to disasters, their ability to bear and/or manage risk, and 
a means o f  assessing the effectiveness o f  their policies and investments on disaster 
risk management performance; and
c) Facilitating the exchange o f technical information for risk management policy and 
programs in the region.
In the first instance, the program is directed to decision makers in the economic sphere. 
The aim at this level being to demonstrate that the financial burden, imposed by one, or a 
succession o f different disasters, may be reduced through prudent risk management and disaster 
mitigation policies.
In the second instance, the program is aimed at those in charge o f the operative offices o f  
disaster management at all levels o f Government. The aim at this level is therefore to provide the 
necessary information to facilitate an improvement in response actions for all stages o f  a disaster.
Finally, the program is intended to make those in charge o f providing technical-scientific 
information on hazards and risks o f disasters, aware o f the kind o f information needed by 
decision makers.
7The ECLAC/IDB program has been divided into four phases, outlined as follows:
a) Definition o f  a Conceptual Framework and development o f  specific Methodologies 
for the evaluation and design o f strategies for risk management;
b) Undertaking pilot case studies and a national dialogue on policies;
c) Comparison, at the regional level, o f  national experiences derived by the case 
studies; and
d) Preparation o f a final report containing the results o f  the three previous phases, as
well as policy proposals and risk management strategies for disasters that could be
adopted by countries in the region.
It was intended that a preliminary version o f the output o f  the first phase be provided to 
the teams carrying out the case studies, as a guide for performing the required tasks.
The second phase constitutes the prim ary part of the component that is presented in 
this report. Its objectives, activities and expected outputs are summarized in Section two 
following.
2. Project Activities
8II. SCOPE OF W O RK  FO R PILOT CASE STUDIES
In all, five national case studies are to be undertaken to address the general objectives described 
above. In these studies, existing policies for the prevention o f risk for emergency management, 
and for recovery and reconstruction are to be examined.
In order to have a wide range o f scenarios to be considered, representative countries have 
been selected from the Latin American and Caribbean sub-regions that have different economic 
sizes and levels o f  development. These are Jamaica, Colombia, Chile, Mexico and Nicaragua.
The objectives o f  each study are to:
1) Identify sources o f  information/analysis on natural disaster risk in the specific 
country. Evaluate their quality, adequacy and accessibility.
2) Evaluate the perception o f risk among the population.
3) Determine and assess the risk management mechanisms applied before and after a 
natural disaster.
4) Determine the way(s) in which risk is borne at varying levels o f  the society.
5) Develop scenarios o f extreme events that would affect the studied populations.
6) Evaluate the methodologies proposed in the first phase o f  the overall program.
For each country, the following items will be investigated:
• Information on risk and on risk perception;
• Risk management; and
• Financial management o f risk.
9III. COUNTRY BACKGROUND
1. Geography and climate
Jamaica has a total area o f  11,244 square kilometres and is the third largest island in the 
Caribbean. It is 236 kms long and between 35 and 82 kms wide. The island is extremely 
mountainous and less than one— fifth o f  the land is relatively flat, in the form o f coastal plains, 
inland valleys, flood plains and river terraces. O f the remainder, much o f the land is very steep. 
The highest peaks are in the east where the Blue Mountains peak at 2,256 metres. More than 
one— half o f  the country is at least 305 metres above sea level and over one— half o f  the land has 
slopes o f over 20%.
Figure  3.1 
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Many rivers radiate from these highlands, chief among them being the Rio Grande, which 
collects much o f the drainage o f  the island’s north-east slopes, and the Yallahs River, which 
drains the central southern and south-eastern slopes. To the south-west o f  the island, the Black 
River drains an adjacent morass, which is home to the largest herbaceous wetland system in 
Jamaica.
Jamaica's climate is tropical marine. The mountainous terrain, the north-east Trade Winds 
and land-sea breezes all act to modify the climate. These give rise to micro and macro-scale 
spatial variations in the seasonal distribution o f rainfall. The average annual rainfall for the
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country as a whole is 195.8 cm, with a wide range being experienced between locations. In the 
Blue Mountain areas for example and the north-eastern coastal areas, which lie in the path o f the 
trade winds, as much as 375 cm o f rainfall is received annually. Kingston lies on the leeward side 
o f  the Blue Mountain range and receives on average 125 cm o f rainfall annually. Although the 
annual overall total rainfall is high, droughts that occur outside the rainfall seasons pose a serious 
problem for agriculture and the provision o f potable water for urban areas.
Exceptionally heavy precipitation occurs under the influence o f hurricanes and tropical 
depressions. Thirty-seven hurricanes and tropical storms were recorded between 1900 and 1991. 
During the same period there were 20 floods and four island-wide droughts. Considerable crop 
damage is also caused by high winds, even in the years when there are no hurricanes and tropical 
storms.
2. Population
At the end o f 1998, the mean population o f Jamaica was estimated at 2,566,900. In addition, for 
that year the Statistical Institute o f  Jamaica (STATIN) estimated the crude birth rate to be 19.96 
per 1,000 mean population and the crude death rate to be 6.7 per 1,000 mean population. By the 
end o f 2005, the population had increased to 2,660,700, while the numbers for the two other 
parameters had decreased to 15.76 and 5.85 respectively per 1,000 mean population. The gender 
ratio has remained constant over the past five years with 99.8 males per 100 females. Two 
important current demographic trends in Jamaica are the contraction in the household size and the 
proportion o f the population in the younger age groups. These are attributed to the significant 
decline in the fertility rate over the last two decades. From an overall perspective, Jamaica's 
population is aging, in that approximately 10% is in the age group 60 years and over. It is still at 
this stage however, considered to be a relatively young population with a median age o f  26 years.
Larger households and a larger proportion o f children are more common in rural areas, as 
are female headed households and lower consumption expenditure. The Survey o f Living 
Conditions (SLC 1997) reports that the proportion o f households with female heads was 44.7% 
o f  total households in 1997, which is not significantly different from the 1996 figure o f  43.8%. A  
micro-scale survey conducted in the inner city district o f  Kingston in 1990 indicated that 49.4% 
of the households surveyed were female headed.
The SLC (1997) reports an average household size o f  3.9 persons. The proportion o f  
households with five or more members declined from 44.2% of all households in 1975 to 33.5% 
in 1992. The proportions for 1997 represent 2.6% points decrease for households with 6+ 
members, and 2.4% points increase for households with two to four members, over those for 
1996. In the 1990 survey o f  the inner city o f  Kingston the average size o f  households was 2.75. 
Within this inner city area, the majority o f  households occupied one room, 17% occupied two 
rooms and 5.8% occupied three rooms. Six and a half percent (6.5%) owned their own property, 
45.5% paid rent and 47.2% were squatters.
The island’s working age population (15-64) years increased to 62.3% up by approx. 3% 
points since 1991 and comprised 825,500 males and 807,000 females.
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The population density o f  Jamaica is 216 persons per square kilometre. This is 
comparatively high for the Caribbean and Latin America, and is eight times the average for lower 
middle income countries. In a Caribbean context, population density ranges from a low o f 28 
persons per square kilometre in the Bahamas (although this is misleading, as it is not at all 
representative o f  the specific population density on the island o f New Providence), to a high o f  
600 persons per square kilometre in Barbados. The island o f St. Lucia probably represents a 
median or average value for the region, with a population density o f 250 persons per square 
kilometre.
The parish o f Kingston has the highest population density o f  1,838 persons per square 
kilometre, followed by St. Andrew with 484 persons per square kilometre. The parish o f  
Trelawny had the lowest population density, with 32 persons per square kilometre (Population 
Census 1991). The regional disparities in population densities impact on regional threats to 
natural resources and environmental problems, in that, in some areas population pressure may 
lead to catastrophic and unsustainable use o f  natural resources while other areas remain under—  
utilised and underdeveloped. Rural areas are low population density areas, and environmental 
concerns for these areas are therefore largely associated with the way in which the rural 
population uses resources, rather than with the problems usually associated with large 
populations.
The parish o f Kingston was classified as being 100% urban in the 1991 census, followed 
by St. Andrew with 87% and St. Catherine with 70.7%. The Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA), 
which includes the city o f  Portmore, is one o f  the largest urban areas in the Caribbean and 
contains approximately 26% of the country's population. More significantly, the land area o f  the 
KMA zone has now expanded westward and is currently experiencing an annual growth rate o f  
2.30%, which represents the fastest growing o f the country's urban areas. This extensive, rapid 
and poorly managed urbanisation can be expected to contribute significantly to pollution o f the 
air and water resources and to severe waste management problems. Highly polluted water and air 
borne pollutants are known to increase morbidity and respiratory diseases and other illnesses. In 
addition, this type o f urbanisation exposes the population to greater threats from both natural and 
anthropogenic hazards, as uncontrolled developments and squatter settlements typically expand 
into high risk areas.
The population o f most o f the other parishes is still predominantly rural, varying from 
71.2% rural in Clarendon to 91.3% in Hanover—  the most rural parish in Jamaica. Nine o f  the 14 
parishes are over 70% rural (Statistical Institute o f Jamaica).
The table following gives population estimates for all parishes for the years 1991, 1996, 
1999, 2000 and 2001.
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Table 3.1
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN PARISHES FOR 1991, 1996, 1999, 2000 AND 2001 (STATIN)
1991 1996 1999 2000 2001
Population % Population % Population % Population % Population %
K ingston  &  
St. A ndrew
646  100 26 .9 691 500 2 7 .4 7 10  500 2 7 .4 7 16  000 27.5 7 1 9  900 27.5
St. Thom as 85 300 3.6 89 400 3.5 91 700 3.5 92  400 3.5 92  700 3.5
Portland 76 500 3.2 78 600 3.1 7 9  200 3.1 7 9  400 3 79  400 3
St. M ary 109 200 4.3 111 800 4 .4 112  800 4 .4 112 800 4.3 112  900 4.3
St. A nn 150 600 6.3 158 200 6.3 163 400 6.3 164 900 6.3 167 300 6.4
Trelaw ny 71 400 3 72  500 2.9 72  500 2.8 72  500 2.8 72  500 2.8
St. James 156 200 6.5 169  800 6 .7 178 200 6 .9 180 800 6.9 182  600 7
H anover 66 400 2.8 67  900 2 .7 6 7  700 2.6 6 7  500 2.6 67  200 2.6
W estm oreland 128 900 5.4 134 800 5.3 139  000 5.4 140 600 5.4 141 800 5.4
St. E lizabeth 146 100 6.1 149 000 5.9 148 800 5.7 148 600 5.7 148 300 5.7
M anchester 161 600 6.7 177  500 7 185 900 7 .2 188 800 7.2 192  400 7.3
Clarendon 215 980 9 223 800 8.9 2 2 7  700 8.8 2 28  300 8.8 229  400 8.8
St. Catherine 3 84  500 16 4 02  600 15.9 411 600 15.9 413  200 15.9 414  700 15.8
3. General ecology
The marine ecology o f  the island can be characterised by three primary ecosystems: mangroves, 
sea grasses and coral reefs. Mangrove colonies contribute to bio— diversity through the provision 
o f nursery and habitat areas for juvenile fish and non— motile species. In addition, during times 
o f rainfall induced flooding, mangrove stands serve to filter out fine sediments occurring in flood 
waters from entering to the sea. These colonies also serve to attenuate the negative effects o f  
storm surge during the passage o f  hurricanes, through acting as a “soft” barrier against the 
incursion o f the sea. Sea grasses, which form the second primary tropical ecosystem, play a key
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role in the regeneration o f sandy beaches that are common throughout the Caribbean. This is 
achieved through a symbiosis with coralline algae, which is frequently found to be a major 
component o f  Caribbean beaches. Through their role in beach and (subsequently) dune building, 
sea grasses therefore also contribute in an indirect way to the reduction in vulnerability o f  coastal 
areas. From this perspective, it is important that the many tourism developments that are taking 
place in Jamaica and in other Caribbean nations be done in a manner whereby removal o f  sea 
grass beds is carried out in tandem with replacement strategies. Finally, coral reefs provide a very 
important ecological and physical function for these islands. In addition to also being a source o f  
sand for adjacent beaches, these reefs provide a physical barrier against the incursion o f hurricane 
waves. They therefore serve to reduce vulnerability o f the shorelines in their lee and so should be 
preserved as much as possible. Threats to the sustainability o f  these organisms come, inter alia, 
typically from polluted seawater, from micro-organisms, from construction activities and from 
land— based pollution due to agriculture and sewage.
On the terrestrial side, Jamaica presently has large tracts o f  forest, particularly in the 
eastern sections o f the island. Over the past several years, agricultural practices have contributed 
to the deforestation o f several watersheds, which in turn results in a major problem related to the 
water borne transport o f  silt during flood events. In some instances, flood water transported 
sediments have resulted in the nearly complete wash-out o f  communities who have built in areas 
that were previously perceived to be safe, but which were in fact in a floodplain.
The following Table 3.2 gives a summary o f land use and forestry areas, in 1989 and also 
in 1998, in square kilometres.
The table shows that in the period between 1989 and 1998, there have been only minor 
reductions in the forest cover. In addition, other STATIN information indicates that the use o f  
charcoal as a fuel has remained relatively constant and at a low level, in comparison to other 
energy forms. These points to the fact that deforestation has primarily taken place as a result of  
changing agricultural practices, leading to some instability o f watershed slopes.
Jamaica depends on surface and underground water for its supply o f potable water. Water 
pumped from wells or collected from rivers undergoes treatment at a number o f plants throughout 
the island, is stored in reservoirs and then distributed to the public. Monitoring o f water quality is 
carried out by the National Water Commission’s laboratory as well as by the Ministry o f Health. 
Salinity levels, as a result o f  sea— water incursion, have been detected in a number o f wells, and 
this has resulted in closure o f those wells. Nitrate pollution has also caused closure o f several 
wells, particularly on the plains o f  Kingston and St Catherine. Traditionally, septic pits have been 
used for the disposal o f  sewage, but because o f  the nitrate pollution, there has been an effort to 
enforce building o f  sealed septic tanks in areas not served by sewage plants to minimize the 
pollution o f potable water from well systems.
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LAND USE AND FORESTRY AREAS (1989 AND 1998): STATIN
Table 3.2.
Land Use 1989 1998
Built up land 531 523
Buildings/other infrastructure 519 523
Bauxite land 12 49
Agricultural land 4 150 4 026
Fields 2 732 2 745
Plantations 831 823
Other agricultural land 587 458
Other non—forest areas 136 136
Bare rock 9 9
Small islands 2 2
Herbaceous wetland 109 109
Water 17 16
Total non—forest land use/cover 4 817 4 734
Forest 3 429 3 402
Land Use 1989 1998
Bamboo 28 30
Mangrove 98 97
Land Use 1989 1998
Closed broadleaf 887 882
Disturbed broadleaf 1 812 1 786
Short open dry 121 121
Swamp 24 23
Tall open dry 421 420
Pine forest plantation 50 43
Mixed land use/cover 2 708 2 828
Jamaica (Forestry Dept.) 10 964 10 964
Scale discrepancy 27 27
Jamaica (Survey Dept.) 10 991 10 991
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IV. RISK  EXPOSURE TO NATURAL HAZARDS AND DATA SOURCES
Jamaica, as a result o f its setting within the Caribbean basin, is prone to numerous specific 
natural hazards (Figure 4.1a). Recent hurricanes experienced within the last few years (and in fact 
since 1988 with hurricane Gilbert), have reminded us o f  Jamaica's great vulnerability to hurricane 
effects. It is envisaged also that a large earthquake could do considerable damage to sectors o f  the 
population and to infrastructure and could result in displacement and homelessness among large 
sections o f the population, particularly in the highly urbanized areas o f the Kingston Metropolitan 
Area (KMA). The strongest recorded earthquake was the 1692 event which destroyed Port Royal, 
at that time the commercial capital o f  the country. The last major earthquake occurred nearly a 
century ago in 1907. This earthquake had an estimated magnitude o f 6.5, with an epicentre just 
five miles inland from Buff Bay on the north-east coast. More recently, in 1993, there was 
another moderate earthquake with epicentre in the hills above Kingston. This event had a 
magnitude o f 5.4. In addition, regular flooding events associated with troughs and frontal systems 
are known to affect people and communities right across the island. Finally, even though Jamaica 
has not in recent times been affected by a major tsunami, there is some risk o f occurrence o f this 
type o f  phenomenon, as a result o f submarine landslides either at the island coastline, or from 
submarine features further away. Tsunamis were reported from the 1692 and 1907 earthquakes. 
Within a regional context, the following figure (Figures 4.1b) provides an indication o f the 
primary causes o f fatalities from natural disasters and also, the islands where most o f these have 
occurred. Over 6,000 people have lost their lives in the Caribbean over the last 30 years due to 
natural disasters. In the Greater Antilles, these have been primarily due to hurricanes, floods and 
earthquakes.
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1. Flooding
A flood can be defined as an abnormally high stream flow, which overflows the natural or 
artificial banks o f  a stream or river. In general, four different types o f  flooding have been known 
to occur. These are:
a) Flash Floods. These often result from heavy rainfall or cloudbursts over a relatively 
small drainage area. These types o f  floods are most common in mountainous areas. Flash floods 
are difficult to forecast.
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b) Riverine Floods. These generally result from large amounts o f  rainfall falling in river 
systems with tributaries that drain large land areas. Riverine floods can last from a few hours to 
days depending on the intensity, amount and distribution o f rainfall.
c) Land Based Flooding. Some land areas can be subject to large amounts o f  rain in a 
short time. Depending on slope angle, soil porosity, shape and size o f  the river basin or 
catchment area and state o f  deforestation, this can lead to land-based flooding, which can be 
exacerbated by obstructions in the drainage channels.
d) Ponding. Ponding o f water is known to result from a slow build up in depressions, 
sinks, and areas with soil substrates having a clay base and/or slow percolation rate.
a) Causes of Flooding in Jam aica
Large-scale flooding in Jamaica has most frequently been caused by overflow o f rivers, or 
ponding and overland flow from rising underground water. The floods o f  1986 and 2001 are 
examples o f  the former, while the floods o f  1979 and 2002 (in the parish o f  Manchester) are 
examples o f  the latter. Flash flooding has also been known to occur in the upper reaches o f  major 
rivers such as the Rio Grande, Rio Cobre, Rio Minho and Wagwater. In urban settings, severe 
inundation o f streets and communities often follows heavy rains due to blocking o f drainage 
channels by solid waste, and the deteriorating condition o f these drains.
b) Flood History
Floods are the most frequently occurring natural hazard in Jamaica, and are often linked with 
severe weather systems, frontal systems and troughs, and less often with hurricanes and storms.
The Disaster Catalogue at the Office o f  Disaster Preparedness and Emergency 
Management (ODPEM) contains written records o f flood events in Jamaica that date back to the 
19th Century. The analysis presented following is based on information that has been taken from 
the catalogue for the period 1884-2000. Within this period, some 187 incidents o f  flooding are 
reported, however not all reports refer to a specific date or to an easily identifiable location. In 
addition, some pages o f  the catalogue are missing.
Figure 4.2 below shows the spatial distribution o f flooding by parishes. From this figure, 
it can be seen that all parishes are affected by flooding, although some more so than others. The 
records show that Portland has experienced the greatest number o f floods, closely followed by St 
Thomas, Clarendon, St Catherine and Kingston and St Andrew in that order. Manchester and 
Hanover receive the lowest number o f floods.
An analysis o f  those floods where dates have been recorded (Figure 4.3) reveals that the 
highest numbers o f  floods occur in October, with a secondary peak in May. September and 
November share the next highest number o f floods. Surprisingly, the months o f  December and 
January have also recorded a relatively high number o f floods, although traditionally these are 
dryer months. Floods in those months are usually associated with cold fronts and “northers” 
(systems associated with extra-tropical storms).
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From the historical records, a large flood was noted to occur in 1886. According to the 
reports, water rose between 18 and 30 metres (60 and 100 ft) in the Cave Valley area. The loss of  
several bridges was reported in St Catherine and Clarendon, while Kingston also suffered 
damage. An estimated 162 cm (64 inches) o f rain fell in Mandeville, said to be the highest 
monthly rainfall then on record in Jamaica. Despite the fact that the Rio Cobre rose some 7.5 
metres (25 ft) at that time, it did not rise as high as in the floods o f  November 1874, according to 
accounts in the Disaster Catalogue.
In November 1909, the eastern end o f the island (St. Thomas and Portland) was affected 
by heavy rains, which caused extensive damage to infrastructure. Reports are that outpouring o f  
flood waters and sediment from the Yallahs River broke the submarine cable located o ff—shore. 
Another cable offshore Bull Bay was also broken. The loss o f  these cables meant that Jamaica 
was virtually “cut o ff from the world for several days”. 1
Figure  4.2
FL O O D  D ISTR IB U TIO N S BY PA R ISH  (1884 -  2000) [O D PEM  R ECO RD S]
Although approximately fifty major floods have affected Jamaica since the 1880’s, two o f  
these have had significant, positive, long term effects.
On the night o f  June 12, 1979 intense rainfall, associated with a tropical depression, fell 
on the western section o f Jamaica, resulting in the deaths o f 41 persons, and affecting the parishes 
o f Hanover, St James, Westmoreland, St Elizabeth and parts o f  Trelawny. An estimated 40,000
1 Disaster Catalogue, ODPEM Offices
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persons were displaced and there was extensive damage to agriculture, infrastructure, health 
systems and housing. Four weeks after the rains, several towns were still inundated with water at 
depths o f  up to 27 metres (90 feet), and residents had to be ferried by boat. According to O ’Hara 
and Bryce (1984), 2 the rains resulted in damage to approximately 2,500 square kilometres, and 
affected 1,150 settlements and160,000 persons.
Figure  4.3
FL O O D  D ISTR IB U TIO N S BY M O N T H  (1884 -  2000)
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At the time o f this flood, there was no national disaster management office in Jamaica. 
Following the floods, the Office o f  Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Relief Coordination 
(ODIPERC) was established in 1980, with the assistance o f  some international agencies. 
ODIPERC later evolved into the Office o f  Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management 
(ODPEM), a statutory body established under the Disaster Preparedness and Emergency 
Management Act o f  1993.
Another positive effect o f that flood was the relocation o f residents o f  Newmarket, which 
had been severely affected, to a new town, Lewisville, which was constructed above the flood 
level.
Unfortunately, Newmarket was allowed to remain intact, and today is again occupied, and 
continues to be affected by flooding.
June 1979 Floods in Western Jamaica: A Review of the Physical Effects and Analysis of 
Damage, Martin O’Hara and Roderick Bryce, 1984, Geological Survey Division.
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The second flood that resulted in positive spin-offs occurred in 1985, when rains 
associated with hurricane Kate caused flooding in the central parishes o f  St Ann, Clarendon, 
Manchester and St Elizabeth. Five (5) persons lost their lives, and some 60,000 farming families 
in southern Clarendon were affected. In addition, there was damage to the road network, as well 
as loss o f power and water supply in many areas.
Following the 1985 floods, the Government o f Jamaica made a decision to address the 
issue o f flood hazard. Again, international assistance was sought and the Flood Plain 
Mapping Project was started. This comprehensive project, which was implemented by the 
Water Resources Authority (WRA), encompassed flood risk mapping for eight major rivers, 
development o f  community flood warning systems and installation o f  an automated, real time 
flood warning system for the Rio Cobre River, as w ell as public awareness programs that 
were aimed at changing farming and environmental management practices. Even though the 
program has not continued to its full extent, some aspects o f  the program are still operating 
today, with the installation o f  community flood warning systems in several river basins and 
some ongoing flood hazard mapping o f the 5, 10, 25, 50 and 100 year return period events. 
Presently, the Flood Water Control Regulation Act is to be revised, to enable the W RA to be 
able to complete the mapping o f all major watersheds in Jamaica.
It is o f  interest to note that in 1986 between May 23 and June 6, intense rainfall again led 
to severe flooding in central Jamaica, with average water depths o f  2.4 metres (8 feet) covering 
the central and southern plains.
Some areas experienced inundation depths o f  up to 4.6 metres (15 ft). This flood resulted 
in 46 deaths. Over 7,300 ha (18,000 acres) o f  crops were lost, and damage to roads and other 
infrastructure was extensive. The cost o f damage (direct damage) was estimated at J$415 million 
(75.5 million dollars).
c) Flood Events in the Second M illennium
Since 2000 there have been a number o f severe flood events that have caused dislocation o f the 
population and disruption o f economic activities.
From December 29, 2000— January 04, 2001, heavy rains associated with a frontal 
system caused flooding in Portland, St. Mary, Trelawny, St. Ann, St James, St. Catherine and St. 
Andrew. The most intense rainfall during that period occurred in Montego Bay, which 
subsequently experienced the worst effects. For the period Jan 1st and 2nd, 2001, 179.5 mm. and 
124 mm o f rainfall respectively were recorded at Montego Bay. Overflow o f the South Gully 
inundated the town and caused flooding o f many businesses. Houses in close proximity to the 
gully were also flooded. Damage for this event was estimated at approximately $J200 million 
(4.4 million dollars).
From October 28th to November 5 th 2001, spiral bands associated with Tropical Storm 
Michelle (later hurricane Michelle), caused heavy rainfall over eastern Jamaica, with Portland 
and St Mary receiving the heaviest showers. Although the centre o f  Michelle passed between 550 
and 600 km west o f  Negril, Portland and St Mary suffered extensive flooding as a result o f  the
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intense rainfall. Western Jamaica was also affected, as high seas caused severe damage to the 
coastline.
Photo  4.1
DA M AG E T O  T H E  A B U TM EN T O F  T H E  SW IFT  R IV E R  B R ID G E 
PO R TL A N D  (N O V E M B E R  2001)
Photo  4.2
R O A D  DA M A G E IN BY B R O O K — PO R TLA N D  
(N O V E M B E R  2001)
The breakdown o f damage by sector resulting from the November 2001 flooding was 
computed in accordance with the ECLAC methodology and is shown following in Table 4.1.
Total damage from this event was calculated at J$ 2,521 million, o f  which J$ 2,455 
million was attributable to direct damage. This was an estimated 0.8% o f GDP and 201% of  
exports at 2000 (Disaster Catalogue, ODPEM).
In 2002, between May 21st and June 4th, intense and prolonged rainfall over Jamaica resulted in 
severe flooding across the entire island. However, central Jamaica was most affected. Rainfall 
figures associated with the event showed that unusually intense rain had fallen in several 
parishes. A summary o f these measurements is presented following:
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DAMAGE CAUSED BY HURRICANE MICHELLE 3
Table 4.1
Sector Direct damage Indirect damage Total damage
Social Sector 249.4 10.9 260.3
Infrastructure 1679.9 6.9 1 686.8
Economic Sectors 525.6 49.2 574.8
Total J$m (Dollars) 2 454.9 67 2 521.9 (55m dollars)
i) St Thomas
• Cedar Valley received 4.4 times the 30 yr monthly mean. The 24hr rainfall for May 26,
250 mm, was 93% o f the monthly mean.
• Sunning Hill and Serge Island received 109% and 139% of the monthly mean
respectively.
ii) St Catherine
■ Innswood received 6.3 times the monthly mean.
iii) Clarendon
■ Osbourne Store received 6.3 times the monthly mean. Several stations in Clarendon, 
received more than 100% o f the monthly mean in a 24hr period, these were:
o Beckford Kraal-101%. 




■ Knockpatrick received 7.8 times the monthly mean.
Six deaths were attributed to the floods. The damage attributable to this event was 
calculated and is shown in Table 4.2 following.
Jamaica: An Assessment of the Economic and Other Damages caused by Hurricane Michelle, 
October 2001. ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean
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Table 4.2
DAMAGE CAUSED BY 2002 FLOOD EVENT 4
Sector Direct damage Indirect damage Total damage
Productive sectors
Agriculture, livestock 578 163 895 204 995 607 784 965 102
Fisheries
Tourism 1 175 000
Manufacturing, distribution 630 600
Social Sector
Housing 66 760 000 1 056 000 56 816 000
Health 32 792 000 10 050 697 42 842 697
Education 2 520 000 700 000 3 220 000
Infrastructure
Transport 1 481 229 000 10 600 000 1 491 829 000
Telecommunication 4 459 000 ------ 4 457 000
Energy, electricity ------ 1 170 000 1 170 000
Water and Sewage 48 700 000 30 000 000 78 700 000
Miscellaneous
Emergency expenditure 7 616 033 696 000 1 457 603
Total J$ (Dollars) 2 122 414 928 259 898 904 2 472 313 832 
(51.2m dollars)
Predictably, the intensity and length o f  the rainfall caused extensive flooding, with 
aquifers in Manchester showing increases o f  up to 90 metres. 5 The extent o f  that flooding event 
led the Government to declare five parishes as disaster areas. These were St Thomas, St 
Elizabeth, Manchester, Clarendon and St Catherine.
2. Hurricane risk
Every year between the months o f  June to November, the North Atlantic Basin becomes very 
vulnerable to tropical cyclones. Within this area, these storms are known as hurricanes. They are 
amazing natural phenomena characterized by high winds, waves, rainfall and surges. They affect 
both inland and coastal regions.
A tropical cyclone is classified as a hurricane only after it has attained one-minute 
maximum sustained near-surface (10m) winds o f 33m/s or more. Below this, these storms are
Jamaica: The Macro-Socio-Economic Assessment of the damage done by Flood rains and 
Landslides, May 2002. ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean.
5 Resurgence of Flooding at Porous-Harmons, Manchester. Water Resources Authority, 
November 2002
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referred to as Tropical Storms. Hurricanes are commonly classified into categories according to 
the Saffir-Simpson Scale shown below in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3.
THE SAFFIR— SIMPSON HURRICANE WIND INTENSITY SCALE
Category 1 2 3 4 5
Vmax (knots) 64-83 84-95 96-113 114-135 >135
Vmax(km/hr) 119-154 155-178 179-210 211-250 >250
Vmax(m/s) 33-43 44-49 50-58 59-70 >70
Figure 4.4 following shows a schematic o f the characteristic components o f  a hurricane. 
These severe weather systems range in diameter from 200-1300 km. Winds in a hurricane 
increase from their lowest speeds at the eye (low-pressure centre) to a maximum, immediately 
beyond the eye. The wind speed then decreases gradually outwards from the eye. O f interest is 
the fact that winds in the right front quadrant o f  the hurricane are strongest because o f  the 
additional forward component due to the movement o f  the hurricane.
Two primary indicators o f  hurricane intensity are wind speed and air pressure in the eye. 
Half o f all hurricane observations have central pressures o f  980 mb or lower (James B. Elsner and 
A. Birol Kara, 1999). 6 Most hurricanes and tropical storms form approximately between the 
latitudes o f 5oN  and 25oN  off the west coast o f Africa, and then track westward across the 
Atlantic Ocean.
Figure  4.4
C H A R A C T E R IS T IC  C O M PO N EN TS O F  A H U R R IC A N E
A N T I C L O C K W IS E  
R O T A T IN G  W IN D S
200 -1300 km.
6 Elsner, J.B. and Kara, A. B. (1999) Hurricanes o f the North Atlantic: Climate and Society. 
Oxford University Press, New York, ISBN 0-19-512508-8.
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a) Frequency of Occurrence
Hurricane records are archived at the National Hurricane Centre (NHC), Florida. Statistics from 
each hurricane season are recorded and logged to the overall database. These records date back to 
1887, although more accurate and improved record keeping techniques became widely used after 
around 1950. In addition, with the advent o f  hurricane hunter aircraft and satellite imagery, it 
became easier to track the path, growth and decay o f these natural systems, and to record their 
characteristics. Several o f  these measurements are now collected even in the eye o f  these storms. 
From a spatial perspective, the records over the past century show that a wide band o f hurricane 
activity exists across the entire Caribbean and northwest Atlantic, with the least activity occurring 
in the area o f  Trinidad.
Computation and mapping o f the number o f tropical storms and hurricanes that have 
passed through 1o latitude by 1o longitude grids, and for a period dating from 1900 through to 
2004, are mapped in Figure 4.5a for all tropical storms and in Figure 4.5b 7 for Category 1 to five 
hurricanes.
These diagrams show that Jamaica lies just outside o f  zones o f significantly higher 
hurricane and storm occurrence. Nevertheless, based on the number o f hurricanes shown in these 
figures, the island has been exposed, on average, to hurricane influences approximately once 
every 5-10 years.
A  more detailed look at the characteristic o f  storms that have passed relatively close to Jamaica 
was carried out, using a Smith Warner International in-house program to select only those 
hurricanes from the NHC records that passed within 400 km o f Jamaica. A  listing o f all such 
storms (Categories 1-5) is presented in Table 4.4 following.
7 Smith Warner International Ltd. 2004
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O C C U R R EN C E  O F  T R O P IC A L  STO R M S IN T H E  C ARIBBEAN
Figure  4.5a
F igure  4.5b
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The table indicates that 20 hurricanes, ranging from category one to 5, have passed within 
a distance o f 400 km o f Jamaica over the 105 year period considered (this translates roughly to a 
frequency o f one hurricane every five (5) years). O f these, there have been six Category 1 
hurricanes, six Category 2, four Category 3, three Category 4 and one Category 5. Further, it can 
be seen that these storms have not been evenly spaced in a temporal sense. Between 1900 and 
1917, nine o f these hurricanes occurred. Again, five hurricanes occurred between 1933 and 1951. 
Between 1964 and 2004, a forty year span, only six hurricanes o f note passed this close to 
Jamaica. This distribution indicates a cyclical nature to the occurrence o f hurricanes near to a 
particular island, or, more likely, within the Caribbean basin.
Damage from these hurricane systems can occur as a result o f  storm surge, waves, wind 
and rainfall, with the approach characteristics o f  each hurricane system tending to bias the 
damage occasioned to one or two o f these parameters.
b) Storm Surge and W ave Action
The storm surge phenomenon is comprised o f numerous components. These include:
■ The rise in water level as the low pressure in the “eye” o f  the hurricane pulls up the water 
beneath it;
■ The effect o f  the hurricane winds pushing the coastal waters towards the shore;
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■ An increase in the mean sea level as waves break in the surf zone;
■ High tide occurrences during the passage o f the hurricane; and
■ Global sea level rise effects.
In addition to these quasi-static effects, there will also be wave run-up onto the shoreline, 
which is not defined as being a part o f  the storm surge, but is considered to be a dynamic effect 
causing a zone o f temporary inundation.
A schematic diagram showing the quasi-static and dynamic effects is presented in Figure 
4.6 following.
Figure  4.6
D E FIN IT IO N  SK E T C H  F O R  ST O R M  SU RG E AND IN U N D A TIO N
In Jamaica, there has been little or no island-wide mapping o f storm surge and/or 
inundation limits. Storm surge mapping was done for Kingston and Montego Bay under the 
Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project using the TAOS model, however these predictions require 
some degree o f refinement, and they need to be interpreted with care. Recently, the Caribbean 
Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH) in Barbados has provided estimated 
Caribbean-wide storm surge heights for approaching hurricanes using the TAOS model. ODPEM 
also does storm surge approximations for approaching systems using the Hurrevac program; 
however there is need for the entire coastline to be mapped at much higher levels o f resolution. A  
storm surge assessment was also carried out for a significant section o f the south coast o f  
Jamaica, stretching from Kingston west to Savanna-la-mar. This work was done as part o f  an 
IDB sponsored South Coast Sustainable Development Study.
Other storm surge assessments, where they do occur, are usually carried out by the private 
sector on a site— specific basis, as part o f  the EIA process for development applications that must 
be vetted by the National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA). It should be noted,
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however, that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is funding a storm surge mapping 
project for the city o f  Portmore, adjacent to Kingston, and a part o f  the KMA. This mapping 
exercise is quite timely, as Portmore is potentially vulnerable to hurricane induced damage, and 
significant discussion has ensued in the past three (3) years in a public forum, as to this 
vulnerability.
One other point o f  interest relating to the issue o f quantification o f hurricane damage and 
mapping o f the potential extents o f  damage, is the fact that latest research indicates possible 
cyclical trends that may, or may not, be due to climate change effects. A review o f the historical 
hurricane data base 8 for the Caribbean region as a whole provides some insight to this issue, 
which is highlighted graphically in Figure 4.7 below.
Figure  4.7
M U LT I— D ECA D A L TR EN D S O F H U R R IC A N E  O C C U R R EN C E  (SW I, 2002)
The diagram shows that for the 100 year period between 1900 and 2000, the number o f  
hurricanes occurring each year has varied considerably. When a trend curve is superimposed onto 
this data, it can be seen that the data is characterized by approximately a 70 year cycle. In 
addition, there appears to be a trend o f an increasing numbers o f hurricanes occurring each year. 
O f interest is the fact that the data points to the commencement o f a period o f higher hurricane 
occurrences, which started in approximately 1995.
As is the case with storm surge mapping, little or no mapping o f hurricane wave heights 
has been done for Jamaica. It should be noted, however, that it is possible to carry out near 
real-time prediction o f hurricane wave heights, as these systems move past Jamaica. This was
8 Smith, D.A.Y., Warner, P.S., and Banton, J.D., Long Term Variability o f Hurricane Trends, 
International Conference on Coastal Engineering, 2002.
31
done for hurricane Ivan in 2004, as it tracked past Jamaica. 9 An example o f  this wave prediction 
is presented in Figure 4.8, which shows the wave field around hurricane Ivan as it moved 
westward and south o f Jamaica. This type o f  analysis allows for a preliminary assessment o f  the 
areas that are likely to be worst hit by surge from a passing hurricane, thereby providing a 
powerful management tool to an agency such as ODPEM.
Figure  4.8
H U R R IC A N E  IVAN W A V E FIE L D  SO U TH — EAST O F  JA M A IC A  
(W AVE H E IG H T S  IN M E T R ES, C O L O U R  C O D ED ) [SW I 2005]
-85 -75
3. Seismic risk
Jamaica lies within a belt o f  seismicity that stretches from Central America south to Trinidad, and 
which defines the boundaries o f the Caribbean Tectonic Plate (Figure 4.9 -  orange dots show 
earthquake epicentres and green triangles show locations o f  volcanic activity). Jamaica’s 
vulnerability to the earthquake hazard is a matter o f  historical record, given the 1692 Port Royal 
event and the Great Earthquake o f 1907 that destroyed the city o f  Kingston.
The level o f  destruction that is likely to occur in any future major quake w ill be a function o f the 
actual size o f the tremor, the location o f the epicentre, the geology o f the areas affected and the 
quality o f  construction o f the residential, commercial and infrastructural assets. The first two o f
9 Smith, D.A.Y., Warner, P.S., Jervis, G. and Banton, J.D., Assessing Hazards and 
Vulnerabilities -  A Caribbean Perspective. Conference on the Solutions to Coastal Disasters, 2005.
32
these parameters are not controllable; however the degree o f  vulnerability o f  the society is a 
direct function o f its investment in preparedness and mitigation.
Figure  4.9
L O C A T IO N  O F  EA R T H Q U A K E  E PIC E N T R E S [U N EC L A C ]
a) Earthquakes
Earthquakes are naturally occurring phenomena triggered by the movement along tectonic 
plates (Figure 4.10) and fault lines that unleash seismic energy in the form o f both body waves 
and surface waves. In layman’s terms, the former travel through the earths crust and are 
imperceptible to man, while the latter, as the name suggests, travel along the surface o f the earth, 
displacing the ground as they proceed and this displacement or movement is what we feel. This 
tectonic shift can be small, as when a short section o f the fault moves a small distance, thus 
generating a mild earthquake. Scores o f  these occur in Jamaica every year and are perceived only 
by the sensitive seismic receptors on earthquake monitors throughout the island and in fact the 
world at large. In other cases, the movement can occur over large distances, shifting perhaps 
several tens to hundreds o f  metres and generating powerful and destructive earthquakes.
The point at which the earthquake occurs is called the focus, and this is typically between 
five and 50 km deep below the ground surface, while the epicentre is the point on the earth’s 
surface directly above the focus. In terms o f size, earthquakes are measured by both Magnitude 
and Intensity. The magnitude is the actual physical strength o f  the quake, which is measured most 
commonly by the open ended Richter Scale. This was first developed in the middle o f  the last 
century. The magnitude measures the amount o f energy released by the tremor and it is a 
logarithmic scale with an increase o f  one signifying a thirty-fold increase in energy.
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Figure  4.10
T E C T O N IC  PL A T E  BO U N D A R IES IN T H E CA R IB B EA N  A R EA
Earthquake intensity on the other hand measures the earthquakes’ effect at a particular 
location. The larger the quake, the greater the intensity given an equal distance from the 
epicentre, and equally the further from the epicentre the less intense the earthquake will be, all 
other factors (such as the geology) being equal. Several intensity scales have been developed but 
the most commonly used is the Modified Mercalli Scale. Intensity scales, because they are based 
on perceived effects o f the tremor, have another utility in that they allow the approximate 
evaluation o f quakes that occurred before the development o f  the Richter Scale. Thus, based on 
historical record, we are able to estimate the size o f events such as the Kingston Earthquake 
(Tremor) o f  1907.
There is, however, some danger in such a practice, as it relies on the subjective perception 
o f the writers o f  such historical record. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the 
changes in building standards that have occurred over time. It is for this reason that it is necessary 
to be wary o f statistical analysis in terms o f frequency o f earthquakes o f a particular size. That, 
coupled with the fact that historical records occupy typically less than one tenth o f  1% o f the 
geologic record, suggests that such analysis should be approached with a healthy dose o f  
scepticism, and would be skewed towards more frequent events.
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b) Geological Factors
In simple terms, Jamaica's geology can be divided into two sections. Referring to Figure 
4.11. 10 Below, the western two thirds o f  the island is dominated by limestone and its derivatives 
(shown in yellow) for the most part, with alluvial plains (grey) and older cretaceous inliers 
(green) being the exception. The eastern third has some limestone also but in addition it has both 
sedimentary and igneous rocks derived from what is loosely called the Blue Mountain Massif. 
The two sections are separated by the large Wagwater Fault system that runs roughly from the 
Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) along the Wagwater River to St Mary. A look at the 
Geological Map o f Jamaica will reveal hundreds o f  minor faults throughout the island with heavy 
faulting surrounding the KMA.
Figure  4.11 
G E O L O G IC A L  M A P O F  JA M A IC A
Differing types o f  geology transmit the surface waves o f  earthquakes in different ways. 
Massive bedrock quickly dissipates the energy o f these waves, while loose or unconsolidated 
material actually amplifies their effects. As an example, the Great Mexico City quake o f 1985 
had an epicentre closer to Acapulco but was felt more in Mexico City because that city sits on a 
“bowl” o f clay that enhanced the destructive energies o f  the surface waves.
This suggests that the more vulnerable areas o f Jamaica are those that are not founded on 
areas where massive bedrock occurs close to the surface, such as Mandeville in the mid-central
10 Map drawn by Gabi Gutierrez —Alonso Courtesy— www.fiu.edu/orgs/caribgeol/jamaica.
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area o f the island. O f concern here is the fact that the largest population centre, the KMA, sits on 
relatively loose soils (alluvium) and as such is at a heightened hazard risk. To aggravate matters, 
saturated soils, reclaimed land and organic rich soils (peat) are at even further risk because o f  
their limited strength and tendency to failure under seismic loads (liquefaction). These latter type 
soils are all found in the major industrial, commercial and transportation areas o f the country. In 
fact the harbours o f  both Kingston and Montego Bay are vulnerable, as is the Norman Manley 
International Airport and most o f  downtown Kingston, as these areas sit on large tracts o f  
reclaimed lands. It is o f  crucial importance that these factors be taken into account in evaluating 
the ability o f  Jamaica to be rehabilitated in a timely manner in the event o f  a major earthquake, 
since if  these essential sectors were to be damaged, the flow o f relief aid and the reconstruction 
effort would be severely affected.
c) Building Codes
The magnitude o f  ground acceleration has been the subject o f  a study commissioned by 
the Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project (CDMP) funded through USAID and the OAS. That 
report suggested peak accelerations o f between 0.35 and 0.75g for the worst case and between
0.15 and 0.4 g for the best— case scenario, both with a 10% chance o f  having this limit exceeded 
within 50 years. Given these recommendations, it is o f  some relevance to compare this with the 
actual building codes that obtain in the country today.
Historically, Jamaica’s building code was developed following the 1907 earthquake with 
the passing o f the Building Act o f  the Kingston and St Andrew Corporation. That Act “provided 
regulations for the design and construction o f buildings and even prohibited structures above 60 
feet” (KMA Seismic Study Report). Given even those regulations, it was and must still be 
appreciated, that building technologies improved over the years and with them so did the codes 
applied to more modern structures.
The National Building Code published in 1983 included seismic loading 
recommendations that were based largely on the Structural Engineers Association o f California 
(SEAOC), which recommended a peak acceleration o f 0.3g with the same 10% probability of  
exceeding the limit within 50 years. Further research and adaptation o f the Caribbean Uniform 
Building Code (CUBIC) suggested a similar application to that o f the SEAOC recommendation. 
Finally, at the request o f the Government o f  Jamaica, a Building Code Review Committee was 
set up and their report was published in 1993. Based on that report, the experiences o f the January 
1993 Woodford Earthquake and work done by Adams and Pereira, the latest revision has 
increased the level o f  ground shaking, for which buildings should be designed, to 0.4g, all other 
probability factors remaining the same. This however falls below the worst— case scenario 
suggested by the CDM study.
The Building Code is now undergoing another review with the input o f  the Jamaica 
Institution o f Engineers. It is hoped that once the code is updated it w ill be promulgated.
Unfortunately, the establishment o f a building code is only half o f  the equation. If 
regulations are not adhered to, either through ignorance, negligence lacks o f  enforcement or a 
combination o f any or all o f the above, then they are in some sense meaningless. The lack o f
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enforcement can be due to corruption, budgetary constraints, or a combination o f the two. The 
Parish Councils who are charged with enforcing these standards in rural communities simply do 
not have the resources to adequately staff their inspectorates with sufficient numbers o f qualified 
people to not only review drawings but also to carry out physical inspections. In the absence o f  
these on— site inspections, the structural integrity o f  for example a housing development may be 
compromised by negligence or simply an unscrupulous effort to save money, even though it has 
been suggested (anecdotal information) that the cost o f  including earthquake design features may 
be as low as 3% o f initial construction costs.
As a result o f ignorance and a lack o f enforcement, large areas o f  the KMA presently have 
unregulated structures that are being constructed regularly. One needs only to look at the second 
storey “additions” to houses in areas such as Portmore to realise this. These structures often have 
limited reinforcement and inadequate foundations and generally have not had the benefit o f  
engineering design. Thus the owners o f  these buildings are ignorant o f the design codes and the 
hazard risk that they are exposing themselves and their families to. Sadly, it is the poorer sector 
o f the society who is most likely to be affected by these circumstances.
In conclusion, the seismic hazard risk faced by Jamaica in general and the KMA in 
particular is real. Despite the statistical limitations inherent in the risk analysis, the country can 
expect a Magnitude 7 earthquake in the future, although how near in the future is beyond science 
at the moment. This tremor, if  close enough to the vulnerable communities in the eastern part o f  
the island, and in particular to the KMA, will be aggravated by unfavourable geology and will 
cause widespread damage to structures that have not adhered to the building codes for a variety 
o f reasons. Given the above circumstances, combined with the poor state o f  the nations’ accident 
and emergency services, including its hospital network, the possible loss o f  life and the economic 
cost o f  the property damage could be overwhelming. On the positive side, most residential 
structures constructed within the last thirty to forty years are o f  reinforced concrete blocks with 
lightweight roofs. This renders the probability o f  catastrophic collapse at least o f  single storey 
structures, somewhat less.
4. Landslide hazards
Next to floods, landslides are the most frequently occurring hazard for Jamaica. Slope instability 
results from a combination o f geological, climatic and anthropogenic factors. Weathered rocks, 
steep slopes, intense rainfall and clearing o f  land and cutting o f  slopes for development make 
landslides an ongoing problem. The National Works Agency records show that the cost o f  
clearing landslide debris and constructing retaining walls has been between J$230 to J$400 
(4m to 7m dollars) million per year since approximately 2001.
Two major north-south corridors which link Kingston to the north coast are routinely 
closed due to landslides occurring after any major flood event, sometimes requiring weeks o f  
rehabilitation. In addition landslides also disrupt water distribution systems (through loss o f  
pipes) as well as power supplies (through loss o f  poles).
Entire communities have also been devastated by landslide action. In the mid-late 1980’s 
for example, the community o f Preston Lands was affected by landslide activity, which destroyed
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the school, roads and farm lands. Most residents had to leave their homes and relocate elsewhere. 
In another community-Askenish-landslide susceptibility mapping was used to guide the 
relocation o f residents to safer areas at the onset o f  landslide activity. This proactive approach 
proved the value o f hazard mapping, as the areas to which persons were relocated were not 
affected by subsequent landslide activity.
Recognition o f  the landslide threat has led to landslide susceptibility mapping o f the worst 
affected parishes by the Mines and Geology Division o f the Government o f  Jamaica, and the Unit 
for Disaster Studies o f  the University o f the West Indies. These maps show the areas that are 
most susceptible to landslides, and, along with other hazard maps, are used to guide technical 
agencies in the development approval process
One such map showing the landslide susceptibility o f  the hills immediately to the north o f  
the KMA is given in Figure 4.12 following. What can be clearly seen is the extensive landslide 
susceptibility in this area.
Figure  4.12
LA ND SLIDE SU SC E PT IB IL IT Y  M A P F O R  NE 
JA M A IC A  (M IN ES AND G E O L O G Y )
L A N D S L I D E  S U S C E P T IB IL IT Y  C L A S S E S  - D e e p  L a n d s l id e s
5. Tsunami hazard
Tsunami events appear to be very infrequent around the coastline o f Jamaica. From a historical 
perspective, the effects o f  a tsunami were recorded on the shoreline o f  Jamaica on November 1,
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1755. That tsunami had maximum observed amplitude o f six metres, and an estimated return 
period o f greater than 200 years. The source o f this tsunami was Lisbon, Portugal.
More recently, on January 14th 1907, a tsunami was observed on the shoreline o f  
Kingston, where the main damage occurred. The available historical record for this event does 
not list the height o f  water attained, or the strength o f the tsunami. 11 In summary, however, the 
occurrence o f  tsunami on the shoreline o f  Jamaica is considered to be a rare event.
6 . Summaries of natural disasters
A summary o f disasters that have affected Jamaica since 1900 is given in Table 4.5 below. It is 
recommended, however, that the numbers be treated with some caution, as they do not appear to 
include some known events. In addition, the categories Windstorm and Flooding are expected to 
include the effects o f hurricanes, although the data is not presented in this manner.
7. Sources and quality of data
A search o f the literature relating to hazards, risks and vulnerability for the Caribbean in general 
and Jamaica in particular, indicates that there are at this time over 300,000 relevant references. 
Within Jamaica, the most extensive references relating to these topics are to be found in the 
ODPEM library and at the Caribbean Disaster Information Network (CARDIN). Regionally, the 
office o f  the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDERA) houses several o f  
these references.
Two reference documents from this reference list are described here. The first, “A  
Bibliography o f Natural Hazards in the Caribbean”, 2001, is published by CARDIN and 
sponsored by ECHO and OAS/USAID. This document focuses on publications that have 
originated within the Caribbean region and in particular those which may have been authored 
within the University o f  the West Indies. The hazards covered by this document include flooding, 
landslides, earthquakes, hurricanes, volcanic activity and drought. Comprehensive listings of 
those references that are specific to Jamaica are given in Appendix I. This reference document 
was developed through a regional cooperative effort, with contributions from the varied 
Caribbean disaster organisations. The references presented are in the form o f research papers, 
books, theses, articles in journals, papers presented, technical reports, etc.
The second reference is noteworthy as it attempts to quantify the country's progress in risk 
management. It is entitled “Measurement o f Disaster Risk and Disaster Risk Management in 
Jamaica: Indicators o f  disaster risk and risk management: program for Latin America and the 
Caribbean: Summary Report—  Omar D. Cardona, July 2005.”
11 Deane, C., Thom, M., Edmunds, H. “Eastern Caribbean Coastal Investigations (1970-73); 
Volume II-Natural Forces”. 1973.
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Table 4.5
SUMMARY OF NATURAL DISASTERS IN JAMAICA FROM 1900 TO 2005
N ° o f  
events





D rought 3 0 0 0 100 000 100 000 6 000
A vg . per 
event
0 0 0 33 333 33 333 2 000
Earthquake 1 1 200 0 0 90 000 90 000 30 000
A vg . per 
event
1 200 0 0 90 000 90 000 30 000
E p idem ic 4 46 0 0 300 300 0
A vg . per 
event
12 0 0 75 75 0
F lood 13 7 67 0 53 4 22 845  290 898 712 1 262  740
A vg . per 
event
59 0 4 109 65 022 69  132 97  134
Slides 1 40 0 0 0 0 0
A vg . per  
event
40 0 0 0 0 0
W indstorm 23 574 225 99  420 1 224  516 1 3 24  161 1 793 9 12
A vg . per 
event
25 10 4 323 57 572 57 572 77  996
Created on Nov— 14—2006.—Data version v06.06
(Source:"EM—DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.em—dat.net—Université 
catholique de Louvain—Brussels—Belgium")
*Events recorded in the CRED EM—DAT. First Event: Jan/1900, Last Entry: Oct/2005.
© 2006 CRED
In this report, Jamaica’s progress in disaster risk management was evaluated using a set o f  
indices developed by Cardona et al. Specifically, Jamaica’s performance was measured as part o f  
a study involving Latin America and the Caribbean. The results are summarized in the 2005 
report quoted above.
The study examined a number o f indices, one o f which was a Risk Management Index 
(RMI) that was designed to assess risk management performance. The index is presented as a 
qualitative measure o f  management based on a set o f  desirable targets. The national index seeks 
to measure the distance between the actual risk management status and the desirable status. The 
RMI is the average o f  four composite indicators — Risk Identification, Risk Reduction, Disaster 
Management and Governance and Financial Protection.
These composite indicators were further sub-divided as follows:
a) Risk Identification
Systematic inventory o f  disasters and losses 
Hazard Monitoring and forecasting
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• Hazard evaluation and mapping
• Vulnerability and risk mapping
• Public information and community participation
• Risk management training and education
b) Risk Reduction
• The extent to which risk is taken into account in land use and urban planning
• Management o f river basins and environmental protection
• Implementation o f control and protection techniques prior to hazard events
• Relocation o f persons living in disaster-prone areas and improvements to housing 
in these areas
• Updating and enforcement o f  safety standards and construction codes
• Reinforcement and retrofitting o f  public and private assets
c) Indicators of Disaster M anagement
Organization and coordination o f emergency operations 
Emergency response planning and implementation o f warning systems 
Supply o f equipment, tools and infrastructure
Simulation, updating and testing o f  inter-institutional response capability 
Community preparedness and training 
Rehabilitation and reconstruction planning
d) Governance and Financial Protection Indicators
• Decentralized organizational units, inter-institutional and multi-sector
coordination
Availability o f  resources for institutional strengthening 
Budget allocation and mobilization 
Existence o f  social safety nets and funds 
Insurance coverage and loss transfer strategies for public assets 
Housing and private sector insurance and reinsurance coverage
The period used for calculation o f the RMI was 1985-2000. According to the study, 
Jamaica made adequate progress in identifying risk. Further the country showed very strong 
improvement in the disaster management area in the mid 1900’s to 2000.
































The authors o f  the report consider that although good progress has been made, the country 
has not yet reached a level close to that desired. O f the 11 countries studied in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Jamaica ranked third behind Costa Rica and Chile in the Risk Management index. 
According to the authors, the probable effectiveness o f risk management in most countries does 
not surpass sixty percent, and most countries average 20%-30%. The RMI given however is not
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related to this average or the 60% mark. The indices show that for the 15 year period leading up 
to 2000, Jamaica made progress in all areas o f  risk management which were measured.
A third document o f  note is the "Disaster Catalogue" which is available at the ODPEM 
Offices. This unpublished catalogue documents hazards and disasters which have affected 
Jamaica over the past three hundred years. Many accounts are taken from journals, newspaper 
clippings and Government departmental reports. As such, it may be difficult to verify the 
accuracy o f  some reports. Nevertheless, it is a valuable historical record.
It should also be noted that ODPEM has compiled reports on hazard impact events which 
document the cause o f  the event, its effects, level o f damage and the response to the incident.
An overview o f these varied reference documents provides some insight into the 
adequacy, quality and accessibility o f  reference data relating to natural disaster risk applicable to 
Jamaica In addition, it is useful to note the likely users o f  this data. These typically will include 
decision makers within Government o f Jamaica agencies, who will wish to access the data and 
recommendations in order to consider them for use in the context o f  national planning initiatives. 
Then, it is to be expected that the disaster managers at ODPEM will require access to these data 
in order to assist in developing pre-, during and post-strategy plans. This latter data use will rely 
more on an analysis o f  historical events, and on the documentation o f models that have been used 
to predict the likely extent o f  impacts resulting from the various hazard scenarios. When 
combined with a sound knowledge o f  the socio-economic characteristics o f threatened areas, 
then the risk profile o f  these communities becomes evident. Finally, the reference data is o f  
interest to the scientific community, who is primarily responsible for the investigation o f these 
natural hazard phenomena, their extents and likely impacts. It is important, therefore, that this 
latter group be made aware o f the requirements o f  the first two.
In terms o f the available database therefore, first, it is clear that there is abundant data 
dealing with this issue, which have been produced over the years by researchers throughout the 
region. In many instances these documents have been produced by UWI scientists, or by 
personnel attached to regional or national disaster management agencies. In other cases, 
investigations carried out by engineers or practitioners in the disaster management and risk 
reduction arena has added to this vast body o f work.
Second, it is necessary to speak to the quality o f these many reference documents. Largely 
due to the fact that these documents have been produced through research initiatives, or as 
commissioned studies, the quality o f  the data appears to be quite rich. In many cases, the 
conclusions presented and the observations made have had the benefit o f  being supported by 
actual events. It is in fact evident, that following the occurrence o f each natural hazard event, a 
number o f papers and theses have been produced dealing with the pre, during and post stages o f  
these events.
Finally, with respect to the accessibility o f  these data, it can be seen that in the Jamaican 
context, the central storage locations are primarily at ODPEM and at CARDIN. These institutions 
are both located in Kingston and are therefore readily accessible to Government agencies, etc. 
One point o f note, however, is that the library at ODPEM could benefit significantly from having 
a metadata base o f  all reports incorporated into an electronic format, and/or the documents 
themselves being copied to microfiche. As an example, attempts to obtain the results o f  a public
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risk perception survey, carried out by ODPEM in 2000, proved futile, as no one in that 
organization, including the library personnel, were aware o f the whereabouts o f  this document.
8. Perception of risk
As indicated above, surveys have been carried out by ODPEM in 2000, to obtain a representative 
sampling o f the public perception to risk. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain a copy o f  
that document as it was not in the library system. Nevertheless, there are some observations that 
can be made relative to the perception o f risk in Jamaica. These are outlined following:
• With respect to flooding, the data shows that there have been regular and extensive floods 
over the period o f record, in a variety o f  locations throughout Jamaica. In some instances, 
many o f the areas that have been affected appear to have suffered repeatedly as a result o f  
heavy rainfall. In other cases, developmental inputs appear to have triggered a 
predisposition to flooding. In either case, the awareness o f  the public to these events is 
evident, as they are described in much detail after each occurrence in the visual and 
written media. In yet other instances, people who have been removed from flood prone 
areas have returned to these same locales, in fu ll knowledge o f  the risk faced. The reasons 
for this may be economic, or may be due to a reluctance to relocate from a familiar area. 
In recent years a trend has been evident in which victims o f flooding have either requested 
relocation or have agreed to relocation. The most recent example is that o f  hurricane Ivan 
in which residents o f  three coastal communities affected by storm surge agreed to be 
relocated inland. This major exercise involved development o f  new residential areas 
complete with infrastructure. It is clear that these residents have developed a full 
perception o f the hazard, its possible effect (vulnerability) and the degree o f  loss likely to 
be experienced in the future (total) and have decided not to accept the level o f risk 
involved in remaining at the vulnerable location.
• ODPEM's efforts at relocation over the years have shown that persons occupying rented, 
leased or illegally occupied premises are more willing to relocate than persons owning 
land (Carby, pers. Comm. 2006).
• For hurricanes, the latter half o f  the last century was initially characterized by a direct hit 
by hurricane Charlie in 1951. Between 1951 and 1980, there were two hurricanes (Cleo 
and Carmen) which came within 400 km o f Jamaica. These hurricanes were accompanied 
by a lot o f  rain, but did not present as intense hurricanes. In 1980, an intense hurricane, 
Allen (Category 5), which tracked north o f  Jamaica, caused a significant amount o f  
damage on the north coast (Photo 4.3). This damage was associated almost entirely with 
the phenomenon o f storm surge and wave action, and raised the public consciousness to 
the risks associated with that particular hazard.
• Some complacency however appeared to have developed before that, because o f the wide 
temporal gap in hurricane effects that occurred between 1951 and 1980. The hurricane, 
however, that completely raised the perception o f risk for the present generation of Jamaicans 
was Gilbert. This was a relatively intense hurricane that affected all o f Jamaica with hurricane
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force winds, rainfall and in certain locations, storm surge. As one example o f the effect of this 
hurricane on the population, it was endowed with a personality and referred to in popular song. 
By the time of hurricane Ivan in 2004, people were much more aware of the dangers inherent in 
approaching hurricanes.
Photo  4.3
ST O R M  SU RG E D A M A G E T O  T R ID E N T  H O T E L  
IN PO R T  A N T O N IO  (A LLEN , 1980)
• Perception o f earthquake risk within the Jamaican population has been perhaps less acute than 
for hurricanes and floods, simply due to the fact that major earthquakes have been less frequent. 
The population in general is aware o f the earthquake in 1692 that resulted in the submergence 
of parts of Port Royal. This however, is treated as an historical event. More recently, in 1907, 
there was also a major earthquake that affected the capital Kingston. Here again, even though 
this resulted in significant damage and disruption, there are very few Jamaicans alive today who 
would remember that event. In 1993, a relatively large quake affected Kingston, however, 
damage was limited. An ongoing public awareness program has, however increased public 
perception of this hazard. Of note is the fact that over one hundred businesses and companies 
participated in a 2006 earthquake drill for the New Kingston area, the heart o f the financial and 
business district in the capital Kingston. It is evident that the participants recognised the risk of 
death and injury to staff and clients posed by ignorance o f what to do in an earthquake, and the 
importance of preparing staff and clients for this eventuality. The high level o f participation of 
schools in Earthquake Awareness Day activities also suggests an understanding o f the threat 
posed by the hazard, even if  the risk to the schools has not been quantified. The activities for 
this day in 2005 attracted more than 5,000 children o f various ages. More recently, a simulation 
exercise was held in the KMA by ODPEM, to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the 
January 1907 earthquake. A scenario was prepared for simulation, which was characterised by a 
6.5 magnitude earthquake (on the Richter scale) occurring at shallow depth with epicentre 
located near Buff Bay in the Wagwater Belt. The earthquake was considered to last for 30 
seconds, with aftershocks occurring for some time. Damage was reported to have been recorded 
in the parishes o f Kingston, St. Andrew and St. Catherine. The simulation revealed many 
weaknesses in the Search and Rescue aspect o f the disaster response mechanisms, which point 
to the need for training o f emergency personnel in this area. Snapshots of the simulation 
exercise and the initial findings were broadcast on national television, thereby helping to raise
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the perception o f exposure to risk from this hazard. Internally within ODPEM, a post-scenario 
briefing was conducted to analyze the thoroughness o f the exercise and to examine the lessons 
learned, in order to be able to act on these findings in the event o f future actual earthquakes. In 
summary, there is a lack o f experience o f actual earthquake events in Jamaica due to the 
infrequency o f this hazard, but there is a level o f awareness that has been generated through 
public awareness activities and through the staging and publicizing simulation events from time 
to time.
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V. THE DISASTER M ANAGEM ENT SYSTEM
1. The risk m anagement structure
The management o f  ex ante and some ex post emergency planning issues is overseen primarily by 
the Office o f Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM). ODPEM as we 
know it was formed in 1993, as a statutory body under the Disaster Preparedness and Emergency 
Management Act. This office is run by a Director General, who reports to a Board o f Directors. 
The office has four (4) directorates: Corporate Services; Mitigation, Planning and Research; 
Information and Training; and Preparedness and Emergency Operations. It is funded by 
budgetary subventions from the Government o f  Jamaica. However more recently, projects funded 
by donor agencies and the proceeds o f a commercial arm o f the agency (equipment rentals) have 
assumed increasing importance as budgetary allocations have decreased.
ODPEM’s mandate covers more than disaster response, and includes preparedness, 
response, mitigation, prevention and recovery (although there is less focus on recovery in the 
mandate). The recovery phase o f  disaster response has most recently been handled by the Office 
o f National Reconstruction, which was set up after hurricane Ivan. ODPEM falls under the 
Ministry o f Land and Environment, but the Prime Minister is the chairman o f a National Disaster 
Committee, o f  which ODPEM is the secretariat. The National Disaster Committee encompasses 
representatives from all relevant sectors. The Committee meets annually, in May, but its six 
sub— committees meet at a minimum once per quarter .These sub-committees are responsible for 
defining policy, ensuring that plans and procedures are in place and updated regularly, and 
reviewing and adopting methodologies for risk management by different organs o f Government. 
They cover the areas o f  Health, Communications, Operations, Public Awareness, Mitigation, 
Recovery, Damage Assessment and Finance.
Each parish has a Parish Disaster Committee chaired by the Custos or Mayor and 
including Government, Private Sector and NGO representatives. The national system o f  
sub-committees is therefore mirrored at the parish level. Below the parish level, some 
communities also have disaster committees called Zonal Committees, which link with the Parish 
Disaster Committees.
The national risk management structure can be represented by a line diagram as shown 
below (Figure 5.1a shows the administrative structure, while Figure 5.1b shows the operational).
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Figure  5.1a.
N A TIO N A L D ISA ST E R  M A N A G EM EN T STR U C T U R E  (A D M IN ISTR A TIV E)
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One o f the operating constraints o f  ODPEM pertains to the fact that the present Disaster 
Management Legislation does not give ODPEM any legal authority for enforcement. The agency 
therefore uses a system o f goodwill and moral suasion. It should however, be noted that a review 
o f the legislation is now being undertaken.
The Director General has suggested that an optimum structure would be to have an 
ODPEM office in each Parish. This could be staffed by one person having a first degree in the 
Natural, Physical or Social Sciences.
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In addition to the national office in Kingston, the agency has regional offices in Montego 
Bay; Mandeville; Kingston; and Port Maria; staffed by one Regional Coordinator in each 
regional office. However, there is a lack o f technical capacity at the parish level. Part o f this 
reporting chain includes the Parish Disaster Committees, which are responsible for disaster 
management in their parishes. Under the National Disaster Plan, they have primary responsibility 
for events affecting less than 20 families. For events affecting over 20 families, assistance will be 
given from the national level (ODPEM). Some parishes are able to discharge this mandate, 
whereas others do not. In addition, parishes should be able to carry out their own preparedness 
and mitigation programs as the parish councils have some autonomy and responsibility for 
approving building plans, development applications and road and drainage network maintenance. 
In reality, few parishes carry out strategic and operational planning exercises related to disaster 
management. It should be noted, however, that the employment o f  trained physical planners by 
all parish councils has provided the opportunity for the parish councils to develop a more 
integrated approach to hazard management.
The optimum operating structure would however, be to have an ODPEM staff member in 
each parish, rather than in each region. This person would provide much-needed technical 
support to the Parish Disaster Committee, as well as be able to oversee and implement ODPEM’s 
in-parish programs.
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Under the present structure, ODPEM has a limited number o f middle-managers, which 
appears to negatively affect their ability to carry out work. An organisational review was 
scheduled to start in November 2005. This review is expected to result in the restructuring and 
strengthening o f the organisation.
a) Policies and Plans
The National Disaster Plan is a comprehensive document setting out mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery procedures for a variety o f  hazards, both natural and m an- 
induced. There are also functional plans for evacuation, communications, mass casualty events, 
aircraft accidents, pandemics, pest infestations, etc. A Hazard Mitigation Policy details the 
Government’s policy in this area.
At the parish level all parishes have a parish disaster plan, though they do not all update 
these annually. Some communities also have community plans. This initiative is ongoing through 
ODPEM and the Jamaica Red Cross, with the target being that all communities should have 
disaster plans and trained teams. Communities with the highest vulnerability to flooding have 
been targeted first.
ODPEM has encouraged all Government Ministries and agencies as well as the private 
sector to develop contingency and continuity plans, and runs workshops on continuity planning, 
which are well supported by the Private Sector.
2. M itigation, preparedness and prevention
Following are some strategies that are used by ODPEM to promote mitigation, preparedness and 
prevention.
• Mitigation strategies are aimed at promoting hazard and risk mapping and vulnerability 
assessments, and incorporating hazard and risk maps in national development and 
physical planning. In order to facilitate this, funding has been sought for flood and 
landslide mapping, as components o f  projects which include establishment o f flood 
warning systems as well as community mitigation interventions.
• As part o f the Development Approval process, NEPA, or any Parish Council, will submit 
development plans to ODPEM for review. NEPA submits plans o f  nine lots and over, and 
the Parish Councils submits those o f fewer than nine lots, where these are planned for 
high risk areas. ODPEM makes recommendations for mitigation measures or for 
non-approval. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) are required by law for 
sensitive and/or major projects, and hazard impact analyses are required as part o f  the EIA 
report. These are also passed to ODPEM for review.
• ODPEM does have a GIS system and a full time person (CUSO volunteer) who works in 
this area. It is assessed that the cost o f maintaining this GIS system, including staffing,
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would be J$3 million per year (50,000 dollars). The agency plans to integrate GIS
technology into all its operations. So far, mapping has been done for specific hazards
only. Themes that have been partially mapped in GIS include:
o Hazards: flooding, land slide, storm surge, seismic (epicentre locations) 
o critical facilities (in progress) 
o drainage systems (in progress)
• Sensitization o f parishes to the importance o f hazard mitigation techniques, and the 
transfer o f  knowledge and skills to these communities.
• Hazard maps prepared under ODPEM’s projects are presented to the local authorities 
(Parish Councils) for their use. ODPEM has also embarked on a program o f  
workshops for planners employed to the Councils, on the integration o f hazard maps 
into the Parish development planning and approval process. Communities are also 
sensitised to the importance and use o f  these maps.
• ODPEM does damage assessment reports for extreme events. This practice has been 
discontinued since the adoption o f the ECLAC methodology, which represents a more 
comprehensive assessment o f  the economic impact o f  an event. However the agency 
continues to do reports on each event, documenting the experience and lessons learnt 
as well as areas for improvement. In addition, plans and procedures are updated based 
on events. The ECLAC methodology is used by the national damage assessment team, 
and is applied whether or not an ECLAC mission is requested. ODPEM also carries 
out non-structural vulnerability analyses for private sector interests as part o f  a wider 
program o f encouraging business preparedness and continuity planning in the private 
sector.
• Further to what has been stated above, it should be noted that there have been three 
ECLAC training missions in Jamaica and three damage assessments. As a result o f  
this, the application o f the ECLAC methodology has been institutionalized within 
ODPEM and other relevant Government o f  Jamaica agencies such as the Planning 
Institute o f  Jamaica (PIOJ).
• Advocacy and support o f  other agencies.
• The role o f advocating for appropriate risk management practices is one o f the most 
important carried out by the agency. This is done through presentations to policy 
— level groups, including the National Disaster Committee, presentations and papers 
delivered at conferences and workshops and organising multi-sectoral national level 
conferences (National Disaster Management Conference).
• In addition the agency supports the efforts o f a variety o f organisations by, inter alia, 
identifying funding for multi-agency projects, sitting on a variety o f committees and 
providing technical inputs such as document reviews.
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• ODPEM is putting in a Communications Network with radios in each parish.
• During the response to hurricane Ivan, most emergency communications were done 
by cellular and fixed line phones. Although the phone networks proved to be fairly 
reliable, there is need for a national emergency radio telecommunications system. 
There are plans by the Government to introduce an island wide digital network, which 
would be shared by all the emergency response agencies. However funding has not 
yet been identified to achieve this. In the meantime, ODPEM is establishing a VHF 
network which w ill provide radio communications into most o f  the island.
• The preparedness program also includes maintaining the national emergency stores in 
Kingston as well as regional stores at ODPEM’s regional centres. In addition, parishes 
are encouraged to maintain parish stores. These emergency stores contain supplies 
such as bedding, lighting, tents and water containers, which are usually required in the 
immediate post— impact period. Food stocks are not maintained, as food is acquired 
from the private sector under Memoranda o f Understanding which include credit 
arrangements.
• An updated shelter list is maintained and shelters are inspected by a multi-agency 
team before June o f each year. As there are no purpose-built shelters, public schools 
and community centres are designated as shelters.
• It is worthy o f note that since hurricane Ivan, the PDC’s and Committees have been 
more sensitised to the issue o f  disaster preparedness. As a result, the data collection 
and response mechanisms for hurricanes Dennis and Emily in 2005 were much better 
than with hurricane Ivan the year before (2004).
• Hurricane Ivan did much to sensitise the country to the need for disaster preparedness 
and the capacity to mount quick and efficient responses.
• Since Ivan, the Parish Disaster Committees have improved their response capacity. 
The reporting and passing o f  data and information to the national level from the parish 
level has shown a marked improvement in 2005 over 2004.
• A program o f community flood warning systems were started by ODPEM in the 
1980’s under the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) funded Flood Plain 
Mapping Project. Under this project, the Aenon Town community was given the skills 
to forecast and respond to floods threatening their community. The program has 
continued through various projects supported by donor agencies. The program has 
now been expanded to include: flood and landslide hazard mapping by the Water 
Resources Authority (WRA) and the Mines and Geology Division (MGD); training o f  
community teams in basic search and rescue techniques and first aid; community 
hazard mapping; contingency planning; and shelter management. Maps produced by 
the WRA and MGD are given to the parish councils for use by the parish and 
communities.
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• The move to a hazard management approach to community interventions has the 
added advantage o f  exposing several agencies and communities to the importance of  
an integrated approach to hazard management. The project teams include the WRA, 
MGD, Meterorological Services, National Works Agency, Fire Brigade, Red Cross, 
and Social Development Commission as well as Parish Disaster Committees.
3. Public awareness programs
Public awareness and education are important aspects o f  the national risk management program. 
ODPEM targets all sectors o f  the population, providing information on the major hazards 
affecting the country. The inhomogeneity o f  the target population requires the use o f  different 
strategies and approaches. These include:
a. Marking o f anniversaries o f  major events — the opportunity is taken to focus on the 
threat and how to reduce or prevent its impact via exhibitions and the electronic and 
print media
b. Interventions in schools — carrying out earthquake and fire drills, sponsoring 
competitions and giving talks to students
c. Staging workshops and seminars for private and public sector organisations on 
contingency planning, continuity planning, vital records protection
d. Sensitisation lectures and talks to all who make a request. The target is to respond to 
100% o f requests for talks, lectures and community meetings and so far this has been 
achieved
e. Training o f community groups
f. Assisting organisations in development o f  their disaster plans
g. Assisting private and public sector organisations to carry out drills and simulation 
exercises to test their plans
h. Promoting development o f  family disaster plans and a high level o f  individual 
preparedness
Learning from disasters in other countries and incorporating the lessons learnt into the 
public awareness program
There is a program for persons with disabilities in which ODPEM runs special workshops 
in conjunction with the disabilities association. These workshops aim to give persons with 
disabilities the information they need to protect themselves and their households. They are also 
encouraged to register with the Parish Disaster Committees.
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4. National forecasting, warning and alerting systems
The ability to forecast the impact o f  hazards and to warn the population in time is critical to 
saving lives and reducing damage to property. The national forecasting, warning and alerting 
agencies are an integral part o f  the risk management structure. The primary monitoring, 
forecasting and warning agencies are the National Meteorological Service, the Earthquake Unit 
and the Water Resources Authority. These agencies monitor conditions related to weather, 
seismic activity and floods, respectively, and maintain close links with ODPEM.
The landslide susceptibility mapping done by the Mines and Geology Division and the 
University o f the West Indies, though not providing warnings in the strictest sense, do provide 
information which is used to alert communities to the risk o f  landslides during heavy rainfall.
Once a threat is detected, the agencies will notify ODPEM, which has the responsibility
of:
i) Alerting the National Response Team (NRT) and the National Disaster Committee, 
and
ii) Advising the public o f  the threat, as well as which measures should be taken to 
safeguard life and property. All Parish Disaster Committees are alerted as part o f  the 
NRT, as are community disaster management teams. ODPEM activates the National 
Emergency Operations Centre based on the forecasts o f  the NMS.
Forecasting capacity for floods is more limited as lack o f real-time reporting rainfall 
intensity and stream flow gauges does not permit the WRA to provide forecasts for flooding 
except for the Rio Cobre River, which has an automated flood warning system. For this river, 
rainfall data is tele-metred into the WRA, permitting warnings to be issued ahead o f time. In 
general, however, the possibility o f  flooding has to be based on predictions o f rainfall levels and 
knowledge o f  previous flood conditions.
ODPEM’s public alerts are issued as news releases which are carried by all media houses. 
The releases are also posted on the ODPEM website.
Community flood alert teams also provide important forecasting and warning services to 
the communities in which they operate. These teams are responsible for monitoring staff gauges 
which measure river levels. Once a critical level is reached, the teams alert the community so that 
measures can be taken to protect the residents. The teams also relay information back to ODPEM  
on the level o f flooding and effects on the community. ODPEM will also alert the flood alert 
teams if  the possibility o f  flooding exists.
There is no reliable method for forecasting earthquakes. The Earthquake Unit 
provides twenty-four hour monitoring o f seismic activity for Jamaica, and relays the location o f  
earthquake epicentres to ODPEM, usually within a few hours o f  the earthquake occurring. The 
unit also provides information on the seismic hazard, including return periods for earthquakes of  
given magnitudes and location o f active faults.
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Media houses in Jamaica are privately owned. However they exhibit a high level o f  
cooperation with ODPEM in ensuring that alerts and warnings are relayed to the public in a 
timely manner. In addition to reading news releases, they provide time for interviews by ODPEM  
personnel without charge. This access to the electronic media has resulted in a high level o f  
awareness o f hazards and applicable precautionary measures among the population.
a) Response Operations
The National Disaster Plan sets out procedures, roles and responsibilities for response 
operations. Parish Disaster Committees are responsible for developing and maintaining parish 
plans. ODPEM is responsible for coordinating the response to national threats and emergencies. 
Coordination is carried out from the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC). Located at 
ODPEM’s Kingston headquarters. Parishes also set up Parish Emergency Operations Centres 
(PEOCs). EOCs are staffed by emergency managers, as well as representatives from fire, police, 
health, transport, utilities, public works, NGOs and other agencies as necessary. In addition, for 
major threats, ministries, agencies and NGOs will set up their EOCs which liaise with the NEOC.
Once a threat is detected, ODPEM is responsible for deciding if  and when the NEOC will 
be activated, and will advise the parishes to activate their EOCs. For localised threats, parishes 
will activate their EOCs as necessary and advise ODPEM. The NEOC can be activated at either 
Level one or Level two depending on the nature o f  the threat. For Level one activation, the 
NEOC is staffed by ODPEM staff, whereas for Level two activations the NEOC is staffed by a
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full multi-agency team. The staffing o f  the NEOC permits management o f  any crisis, and the 
composition o f the team is adjusted to the particular threat. Private Sector representatives from 
the utilities and communications sectors are also part o f the NEOC Team.
Functions o f  the NEOC include:
i) Pre-Impact
Alerting and call-out o f  National Response Team including parishes
Alerting o f  community teams
Issuing warnings to the nation
Issuing precautionary advice
Directing opening, staffing o f shelters
Organising pre-positioning o f  supplies, equipment
Organising activation o f PEOCs
Ensuring availability o f  communications
ii) During Impact
Coordinating rescue, medical assistance 
Issuing advice to the public 
Updating the nation
iii) Post-impact
Immediate impact assessment and creation o f national needs list 
Coordinating rescue 
Coordinating rehabilitation
Management o f  shelters as well as displaced population outside o f shelters
Coordinating ongoing damage and impact assessment
Coordinating needs assessment
Coordinating international assistance
Receiving and tracking supplies -  local and international
Issuing regular updates via media, websites
b) Coordination of Relief
There is a well developed Welfare and Relief Policy and Plan which guides relief 
assessment and distribution. The plan speaks to accountability and transparency issues. In order 
to reduce overlap, duplication o f efforts and gaps, assistance to the affected population after any 
disaster is managed at the parish level. National and Local Government representatives and 
NGOs comprise the Parish Welfare Team which carries out assessments, distributes relief and
reports back to the national level. Supplies are distributed from the NEOC to parishes based on
their assessments, and parishes are responsible for maintaining a distribution and recording 
system. All relief received should be signed for at every level. Signed lists are returned to 
ODPEM. Rehabilitation grants are usually provided after major events. For these grants field
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teams assess each claim, by inspecting the affected premises, and assessing the level o f  loss. A 
recommendation is made for the level o f  assistance. Government and NGO resources are 
combined to achieve the goal o f assisting the affected population. This integration o f NGOs into 
the relief system increases efficiency and adds a level o f transparency to relief operations.
Relief can also include economic support for vulnerable families. After hurricane Ivan, 
female-headed households and household with young children were assisted with grants for food 
and school books and uniforms. Households which had lost their means o f  earning an income 
were given bridging grants while crops were re-planted or tools-of-trade were replaced. In 
addition to relief through ODPEM, the Ministry o f Agriculture makes grants available for 
farmers and fisherfolk whose livelihoods have been affected by disasters.
In order not to compromise the viability o f  local businesses in the aftermath o f a disaster, 
it is the Government’s policy to purchase food and other needed supplies locally, wherever 
possible. This also has the added benefit o f  reducing transportation costs.
c) Coordination of the International Community
The role o f  the International Community is recognised in the National Disaster Plan, and 
major donor partners are invited to attend meetings o f the National Disaster Committee.
At the start o f  the hurricane season, the international community is briefed as to the state 
o f national preparedness. Once there is a major event, the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs and the 
UNDP are co-chairs o f  meetings with the International Community. This includes embassies, 
missions, and donor agencies. Information exchange is achieved through regular briefing 
meetings convened at UNDP Headquarters. At these meetings situation updates are given, the 
official needs list is presented and donors make their pledges. Any assistance received is noted 
and efforts are made to coordinate external agencies which want to participate in response. The 
link between the international community and the NEOC is maintained through the Director 
General (Figure 5.3).
d) Rehabilitation
All post-impact emergency activities are coordinated by the NEOC. There are standing 
procedures which govern rehabilitation o f critical services. For example, hospitals receive 
priority attention for road clearance and reconnection o f power and water supplies after any 
disaster. Shelters are also given high priority. Decisions on which routes are to be cleared first are 
made from the NEOC, which ensures coordination among the utility companies and road 
clearance so that there is agreement on priorities.
In cases where piped water is interrupted, water is trucked to the affected areas.
Close collaboration with the Ministry o f  Health ensures regular inspection o f shelters and 
increased surveillance o f  environmental and public health parameters. Health requirements, 
including monitoring and vector control supplies are included in the national needs list.
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E M E R G E N C Y  M A N A G EM EN T O R G A N IZ A T IO N A L  STR U C TU R E
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e) Recovery
Recovery operations for limited impact events such as localised floods are managed by 
ODPEM. In the past this has included relocation o f affected families, provision o f housing units 
(in cooperation with an NGO), mitigation interventions and hazard mapping. Because o f the 
widespread effects o f  hurricane Ivan, an Office for National Reconstruction (ONR) was 
established to guide the recovery process. Recovery operations post-Ivan included relocation o f  
three communities, repairs to schools and health facilities and road reconstruction among other 
activities.
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The relocation o f communities was necessary because o f  major damage incurred from 
storm surge. Lands for relocation were subject to hazard analysis by ODPEM and other technical 
agencies prior to being approved for relocation. Housing units constructed had to meet basic code 
requirements for small dwellings.
The established systems and procedures worked well in the response to hurricane Ivan. 
The major difficulties encountered were related to lack o f capacity at parish level, which led to 
interruptions in information flow back to national level and late reporting. There were also 
instances o f  departures from the established procedures, which caused some dislocation and 
delays in relief distribution. The positive outcome was that lessons from Ivan were taken on 
board by the Parish Disaster Committees, resulting in significant improvement in responses to 
later threats.
5. Government policy on risk financing and risk transfer
The Government o f  Jamaica does not have a policy o f Risk Transfer. Rather, Government assets 
are, for the most part, uninsured. This culture is changing, as many Statutory Bodies and 
Executive Agencies do insure their property. The fact remains however that as a policy, the 
Government assumes its own risk.
There being no adequate risk management fund, resources for response are provided from 
funding diverted from ongoing programs. In addition, there is no dedicated funding for risk 
reduction, thus perpetuating the vulnerability o f  national assets to natural hazards.
There is a National Disaster Fund (NDF), however, which was started in 1989, after 
hurricane Gilbert. The fund reached a maximum o f J$21 million. However, the present standing 
of this fund is at about J$5M (approximately 80,000 dollars); as this fund was drawn down on 
after hurricane Ivan in order to fund the coordination o f the relief efforts. ODPEM was able to 
double the value o f  the fund, which started at J$4 million, through investment management. Had 
regular contributions been added by the GOJ, the fund would now be at a significant value.
There are indications that the GOJ is examining the matter o f  disaster funding, as the 
Minister o f  Finance recently received a grant from the Government o f Japan to examine the 
feasibility o f establishing a Caribbean Catastrophe Fund.
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VI. ECONOM IC IM PACTS
1. Background
Large catastrophic events like hurricanes have direct costs as they lead not only to large losses o f  
capital stock and inventories but also indirect costs in lost income, employment or services which 
result from lost productive capacity. These events jeopardize internal and external 
macroeconomic stability leading to larger than anticipated public sector and balance o f payments 
deficits. For example, the direct effects o f hurricane Gilbert on Jamaica in 1988 amounted to 
956 million dollars, representing 27% o f GDP, with half from losses in agriculture, tourism and 
industry, 30% in housing, and 20% in economic infrastructure. As a result o f  the hurricane, losses 
in export earnings were estimated at 130 million dollars, representing 14% o f exports, and the 
Government incurred 220 million dollars in additional expenditures while the public sector 
deficit increased from an earlier expected 2.8% o f GDP to 10.6%, also fuelling inflation.
GDP growth performance in 2004 was less than originally forecast by the Government o f  
Jamaica (GOJ). In the first two quarters o f  that year, economic activity grew by 2.7% and the 
economy was on target for a moderate improvement over growth performance o f  2.3% in 2003. 
However as a result o f  hurricanes Charley and Ivan in the third quarter, real income growth for 
the year fell to 1.1% (see Appendix II for details on macro-economic impacts o f  hurricane Ivan). 
Also, as a result o f  hurricane-related expenditure, there was some slippage in GOJ’s fiscal 
targets. Nevertheless, initiatives aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability were successful. 
Exchange rate depreciation was moderate and inflation climbed marginally into double digits. 
Also, the Bank o f Jamaica was able to keep interest rates on a downward path. The current 
account balance o f the Balance o f  Payments (BOP) deteriorated as a result o f  a substantial 
increase in import expenditure related to increased investment and consumption and rising oil 
prices. Nevertheless, the overall balance in the BOP moved into surplus as a result o f capital 
inflows, leading to further accumulation in net international reserves.
2. Sectoral analysis
a) Agriculture
After expansion o f 4.7% in 2003, agriculture output contracted by 11.5% in 2004 as a 
result o f the impact o f  drought conditions in the last quarter o f  2003 and the devastation wreaked 
on the sector by hurricanes Charley and Ivan in the third quarter o f  2004. Losses in the 
agriculture sector due to hurricane Ivan were estimated at J$8.55 bn, approximately 1.9% of  
GDP. Following a decline in production in the first half o f  the year, domestic agriculture 
(vegetables, legumes, fruits and ground provisions) which accounts for approximately 60% of  
agricultural output, lost close to 30% o f acreage under cultivation. Output o f  export crops, with 
the exception o f sugar, also declined sharply. hurricane Ivan totally destroyed banana production
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in the third quarter. Substantial losses, estimated at J$2.1 bn, were also experienced in the coffee, 
cocoa and citrus sectors.
b) Tourism
Due to the impact o f  hurricane Ivan, cruise ship arrivals declined by 2.9% in 2004, 
compared to a growth o f 30.9% in 2003. There was modest growth o f 1.3% in total visitor 
arrivals in 2004, compared to growth o f 16.5% in 2003. Visitor expenditure rose by 6.4% to 
1,437 mn dollars.
c) M ining
Mining activity continued to grow buoyed by increased demand for alumina driven by the 
upturn in world economic activity in general, but particularly in China. Mining activity grew by 
3.3% in 2004 (slightly less than the 3.3% in 2002 and the 4.9% in 2003), and the value— added in 
the mining industry increased by nearly 10% during the first half o f  2004. Total bauxite 
production in the first half o f 2004 increased by 7.6% compared to 3.9% during the 
corresponding period in 2003. Alumina production rose by 10.7% compared with growth o f  
approximately 4% in the fist half o f  2003. However, the third and fourth quarters witnessed a 
deceleration in growth performance in the mining sector as a result o f  the destruction o f physical 
infrastructure by hurricane Ivan. There was a contraction o f 56.5% in bauxite production and 
growth o f 4.9% in alumina production in the fourth quarter.
d) M anufacturing
Value-added in manufacturing expanded by 3% in 2004, following declines o f  0.8% in 
2002 and 2003. A major contributor to this growth was the re-opening o f the oil refinery which 
had been temporarily closed in 2003 for major repairs. The refinery was closed again for repairs 
in the third quarter o f  2004. Third quarter production in the manufacturing sector was also 
constrained by power outages, inadequate water supplies and transport bottlenecks as a result o f  
hurricane Ivan.
e) Construction
Driven by reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts post hurricane Ivan, construction 
activity expanded by 3.2% in 2004, following growth o f 2.4% and 1.2% in 2002 and 2003 
respectively. Growth was also fuelled by a number o f large projects in the road, seaport and hotel 
sectors.
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Hurricane Ivan dealt a significant blow to the authorities’ efforts to contain inflation within single 
digits and supply bottlenecks in the agriculture sector forced food prices upwards. The effects as 
at the end o f the 3rd quarter 2005 saw inflation at approximately 17% up to that time, above the 
rate o f  13.7% for the entire year in 2004, and above the single digit targets that were achieved 
during 1997 to 2002.
4. Financing of the public sector investment program (PSIP)
Given the lack o f fiscal savings, GOJ has been very dependent on donors for financing for the 
PSIP. In part because o f hurricane Ivan, grant funding increased substantially in FY 2004/05, 
rising to J$6.5 bn. (1.2% o f GDP) from J$0.5 bn (0.1% o f GDP) in FY 2003/04. This facilitated 
the significant rise in PSIP expenditure in FY 2004/05 to J$11 bn from J$5.7 bn in FY 2003/04. 
The remainder o f the financing, J$4.3 bn was sourced through domestic and external loans.
Depending on the sources o f  financing for rehabilitation, in the long run the impact of  
disasters at the aggregate level can be positive, negative or neutral. Jamaica, for more significant 
events, may receive external financial assistance on a loan basis for rehabilitation o f  physical 
infrastructure, however for events such as floods, which may have a significant impact on the 
economy (due to significant impacts on agriculture), there may be negligible financial assistance 
provided.
For hurricane Ivan, the Jamaican Government used the ECLAC methodology to quantify 
the extent o f losses to the economy. Excerpts o f  the assessment are outlined in Appendix II. The 
main critique o f  the users o f  the ECLAC methodology has related to the extensive data 
requirements o f  the model, which is extremely challenging to collect, especially after an event, 
and the time required in relation to the timing o f offers for assistance.
3. Prices and inflation
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VII. RISK TRANSFER
1. The property insurance market in the caribbean
Caribbean nations on the whole, are exposed to high levels o f  risk from natural disasters, 
primarily hurricane and windstorm risks, but also significant concentrations o f  earthquake, 
volcano, and flood risks. As part o f a historical strategy to address the financial and economic 
impact o f such risks, many Caribbean islands have successfully leveraged international insurance 
capital and have been able to transfer much o f the risk, particularly for commercial but also 
residential properties, on to the international insurance and reinsurance markets. The same has 
not been the case, however, for public sector assets and infrastructure, many o f which remain 
heavily exposed and implying large potential fiscal liabilities if  natural catastrophes were to 
disable such assets.
Global catastrophes such as past hurricanes or earthquakes around the world generated 
significant reinsurance shortages in the early to mid 1990’s resulting in dramatic rate increases in 
the Caribbean. During the mid 1990’s, Caribbean countries experienced insurance rate increases 
between 200%-300% on account o f shortages o f  insurance cover, due to indemnity payments 
made for large hurricane and earthquake losses worldwide. From a developmental perspective, 
this experience o f market shocks discouraged prudent 'risk hedging' policies in the form o f  
promoting wider-spread insurance practices both in the public and private sectors o f  the 
Caribbean. To illustrate, the average variation on typical catastrophe insurance rates in the 
Caribbean and internationally, within the past decade, fluctuated between 30% and 50%.
Perhaps due to the overly high dependence on the international insurance industry, the 
local industry o f  the Caribbean has not accumulated capital o f  its own to better 'buffer' 
international rate movements and achieve a more optimal mix o f risk bearing capital, leveraging 
both domestic and international funds. The domestic insurance industries are generally highly 
fragmented which accentuates the relatively low levels o f available risk capital in a significant 
portion o f the industry.
Another area for development is the adoption o f mitigation based pricing incentives since 
the lack o f sufficient risk differentiation for pricing purposes tends to penalize those who have 
already undertaken productive vulnerability reduction measures. Welcome signs in the regulatory 
sphere include the tax deductibility o f  catastrophe insurance reserves in some countries, which 
help meet the objective o f  increasing risk bearing capacity.
Policy coverage restrictions are generally designed and imposed by foreign reinsurers, and 
their effect falls on the policyholders rather than on the insurance companies. Historically, there 
have been very mixed feelings as to the industry's role for a proactive involvement in promoting 
hazard and vulnerability mitigation measures. While not denying the inherent benefit o f  such 
measures, the insurance companies' concerns centre on the implementation complexities and 
costs, particularly as reinsurers are seen as unlikely to share in these costs. Most insurance 
companies view the leadership role for mitigation measures as residing with their Governments.
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The insurance markets are intensively competitive for the property insurance classes-a 
competition primarily seeking reinsurance commission revenues rather than underwriting, or 'risk 
taking' profits. The larger Caribbean insurance markets contain insurance companies (with sizeable 
market shares), forming part o f broader commercial groups. It is estimated, however, that several 
insurance companies are under-capitalized and markets are saturated.
2. Observations on Caribbean/Jamaican M arket Characteristics
The year 2004 was one in which the insurance and reinsurance markets worldwide experienced 
severe losses in the Caribbean as a consequence o f four major hurricanes. Assessed insured losses 
in the region have been put at 2.7 bn dollars with 30% being property damage and 70% being 
Business Interruption. These losses exclude the 2% deductible and the effect o f the average 
clause for underinsurance.
In Jamaica the experience was: 7100 claims for 5.9 billion or 96 million dollars, which 
represents less than 2% o f the total sums insured. Cayman estimates are close to 1.4 billion 
dollars which are in excess o f 28% o f the sums insured. The Jamaican experience showed losses 
were prevented by lessons learned in Gilbert about the importance o f construction and hurricane 
straps to strengthen roofs. In comparison to damages sustained in Grenada and Cayman, which 
were a direct consequence o f  poor building construction, the majority o f  the property damage 
from hurricane Ivan occurred to properties that were either not insured or uninsurable. The latter 
were those edifices that continue to be built in low lying areas, riverbeds and other watersheds 
which are prone to flooding and land slides.
The proportion o f residential and commercial properties in Jamaica covered by insurance 
is significantly higher than in most developing countries, on account o f both the susceptibility to 
natural disasters but also on the influence o f tourism and the requisite insurance o f tourist 
facilities. Detailed figures for Jamaica are unavailable, but in comparison with the insurance 
density in United States (3.3% of GDP for the property and casualty business), the average for 
the OECS, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago is 2.3% o f the combined countries' GDP.
The number o f general/property insurance companies in the Eastern Caribbean, however, 
is large. The ratio o f premiums earned ($149 m.) to number o f primary companies writing 
property business (numbering 145) is just a little over $1 million, i.e., the average premium 
written per company. In contrast, the average premium written per company in United States 
(2,500 companies in total), is $112 million or a multiple o f one hundred times that o f  the Eastern 
Caribbean.
However, such a comparison may not be necessarily meaningful given the different levels 
o f development and insurance markets and economies o f  scale. Nevertheless, if  one takes the 
relative populations serviced by insurance companies, the results are: 14,000 inhabitants are 
served by each insurance company in the Eastern Caribbean versus 107,000 inhabitants in United 
States served by each company. This would suggest a potentially over-extended industry in the 
Eastern Caribbean which implies inefficiencies o f  scale in terms o f both operating costs and risk 
management.
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A significant share o f  companies, however, effectively function as agencies with little 
desire to operate as genuine risk underwriters. While most o f the Eastern Caribbean countries do 
not admit non— registered insurance companies, the actual insured base in each country is likely 
higher than reported due to non-admitted providers. In those countries where non-registered 
companies are allowed to conduct business, large commercial and tourist properties are directly 
insured abroad.
Due to the non-reporting nature o f  these businesses at the Caribbean level, figures on this 
market are difficult to estimate although via the tallying o f  the total market value o f insurable 
assets and comparison o f these with the premiums collected annually, one could, by process o f  
elimination deduce the quantity o f assets insured directly abroad.
On average, 75% o f the OECS market is held by Trinidadian and Barbadian companies 
(prior to reinsurance). Expense ratios in the Caribbean are relatively high, between 30%-40% of  
premium income compared to United States average expense ratio o f  between 26%-28%. 
Expense ratios reflect the costs o f business acquisition, brokerage fees, underwriting fees, 
administrative costs and overhead as a percentage o f  annual premiums earned. In the Caribbean, 
due to the relatively small size o f companies and diseconomies o f  scale, expense ratios constitute 
a higher percentage o f annual premium income, despite the fact that administrative and staff costs 
are generally lower than in United States Such costs as well as low retentions o f  underwriting 
risks prevent a quicker build up o f capital reserves/surplus, than could otherwise be achieved.
Some larger and special risk categories (e.g.: power utilities), have also over recent years 
found it impossible to obtain full, and in some cases, any, affordable insurance. On occasions such 
risks have voluntarily devised very high self-insured deductible levels aimed to cover the expected 
loss damage potential and separate self-insurance funding for business interruption. These risk 
management arrangements have served to attract greater levels o f insurance/reinsurance cover for 
the higher, less exposed, risk levels. Furthermore, the insurance cost and availability difficulties 
have prompted trade associations (e.g. Caribbean Hotel Association-CHA), to employ risk 
management techniques and/or off-shore captive insurance company arrangements to buy 
reinsurance on a group basis.
3. Recent lim ited-basis pooling initiatives
For the most part, Government physical assets such as buildings, schools, libraries, roads, and 
some hospitals are uninsured or underinsured. Exceptions include properties owned by statutory 
corporations such as port and airport authorities, as well as utility companies that can 
independently access the insurance markets.
Utility companies in particular, in order to reduce insurance cost, have been actively 
considering a regional self-insurance program with the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and 
the Caribbean Electric Utilities Service Corporation (CARILEC). Although in the conceptual 
stage, the program's principal concepts include a backstop credit line in the initial years o f  
premium accumulation. As the fund grows, the utility companies are expected to rely less on the 
line o f  credit until it eventually becomes a standby support to be used only after the fund is 
depleted because o f claims arising from a catastrophe event at the uppermost loss levels.
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In 1993, The Caribbean Hotel Association (CHA) retained a US-based risk management 
firm to perform a pan-Caribbean study regarding wind storm risks to its members' properties to 
see i f  there was some way o f  reducing the upward spiralling costs o f  insurance. The 
computer-generated wind study performed by a sub-contractor o f  the risk management firm 
provided a probable maximum loss profile o f  the region and divided the Caribbean into six 
different risk zones. The study suggested that there appeared to be enough diversification o f risks 
among these zones to allow a regional insurance company for the CHA properties to survive a 
1.3% probability o f  a major storm disaster event. Using the expected loss (EPL) information as 
the starting point, and based on their own financial modelling capabilities, the risk management 
firm determined a capitalization figure for a regional insurance company to sell 'all risks' property 
insurance to each o f the 1,000 CHA or so members. The risk management firm then created, and 
today manages, a Bermuda insurance company whose exclusive clientele are members o f  the 
CHA.
A 1996 CARICOM working paper on Insurance suggested a regional approach between 
Governments and the Private Sector to enable the diversification o f risk and a reduction on the 
reliance o f  the Caribbean region on the global reinsurance market. It also suggested that 
legislators throughout the region should adopt a consistent set o f  building codes as set out in 
CUBIC, to specify appropriate material specifications, the retrofitting o f  existing structures and 
use o f  protective devices for the region which to a large extent are exposed to similar perils. 
These specifications could then be used by Town planners, architects, builders, mortgage 
companies and insurance companies to ensure that future construction can work together to 
mitigate loss levels.
In a follow up to this working paper, the CARICOM heads o f  Government requested the 
assistance o f  the World Bank in establishing a risk insurance fund. On the 26th February, 2007, 
this initiative became a reality, as the World Bank hosted a Donor Pledging Conference for the 
world’s first ever multi-country catastrophe insurance pool. At the conference, donors pledged 
47 million dollars (€35.7 million) to the reserve fund o f the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk  
Insurance Facility (CCRIF), which is intended to provide participating Governments from the 
region with immediate access liquidity if  hit by a hurricane or earthquake. It was estimated that 
by pooling their risk, the eighteen (18) participating member countries could save up to 40% in 
individual premium payments. The CCRIF is intended to be fully functional by the start o f  the 
2007 hurricane season, and represents an important shift from a disaster response mode to 
an ex-ante disaster management and mitigation mode. It is intended that Governments will 
purchase catastrophe coverage in a manner similar to the purchase o f business interruption 
insurance, which would provide them with an early cash payment after a major hurricane or 
earthquake. The 18 participating countries are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Dominica, Grenada, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Trinidad and Tobago and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Pledges were received from Bermuda, 
Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the Caribbean Development Bank and the World Bank, 
and donors included Japan, and the European Union among others.
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4. Incentives and disincentives to risk-based pricing
For many homeowners, the answer to soaring insurance rates, during the three years following 
1992, was to reduce or eliminate their coverage. With the lack o f statistics, it is difficult to 
measure the degree to which capital stocks are underinsured. The industry realizes that home 
insurance is a discretionary expense, and once terminated, consumers seldom renew. Local 
Governments are, o f  course, concerned since the greater the non-insurance (or underinsurance) 
by a population, the longer it takes for the local economy to recover from catastrophic events.
Policy conditions also provide for the amount o f  claim to be reduced to the extent that the 
amount o f insurance purchased (sum insured) is less than the full insurable value at the time o f  
loss (the 'average clause'). Some variations o f  this exist, e.g., the adjustment is only made if  the 
policy sum insured is less than 85% o f the full market value. Policyholders in Caribbean nations 
with weak currencies and/or high inflation such as Jamaica are especially vulnerable to these 
provisions. Socioeconomic and behavioural factors also merit consideration on both the supply 
and the demand sides o f the catastrophe insurance market and it is helpful to segment property 
assets into their ownership classes:
• Private Dwellings Small/Indigenous, Medium, Large
• Private Businesses Small/Informal, Medium, Large
• Public Ownership Building Structures, Utilities, Public Infrastructures
With regard to private dwellings and business properties, the owners' disposable income 
levels comprise an important factor in the demand for catastrophe insurance, the annual cost o f  
which is near 1% o f a structure's value. This substantiates the observation that the small/informal 
sectors only purchase catastrophe insurance to the extent o f  lending institutions' requirements 
(and these can be limited to the amount o f  outstanding loan principal balances). It is estimated 
that between 25% and 40% o f dwelling stock is uninsured with the small/indigenous segment 
being the least insured. Furthermore, insurance premiums are higher (less affordable) in areas 
which suffer frequent storm events.
Medium and large dwelling owners, without the same affordability constraints almost 
universally carry catastrophe insurance, as is the case with medium and large business property 
owners. In the case o f the latter, business interruption insurance (stoppage as a consequence o f  
catastrophe perils), is seldom purchased although this could mitigate employers' loss o f  income 
and employees' loss o f  pay while a workplace was idle. Larger businesses especially have access 
to insurance brokers (as opposed to insurance companies' own agents), who are adept at placing 
covers with 'foreign' insurance companies, i.e., operating without local registration, 
characteristically from United States or Europe. Such arrangements are especially prevalent in 
those Caribbean nations where foreign currency is readily accessible for premium remittances.
Small property and business owner segments in the less advantaged sectors do not partake 
o f insurance coverage because some small dwelling and business property owners do not 
understand or respect the traditional insurance mechanism. Many expect Government assistance 
in times o f  crisis. Others decide to self-insure, assuming that the returns on funds saved from 
insurance premiums may be sufficient to finance remediation works, although most times the
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savings are absorbed into working capital. Governments as a matter o f  ongoing policy should 
undertake public education programs and publicity on risk management and the prudent use of  
insurance for protection.
5. Developing insurance for low income communities
One o f the primary challenges for Governments in disaster prone regions is the protection o f low 
income communities and the development o f  incentives for community participation in risk 
management measures. The properties, particularly the housing stock o f low income 
communities is generally fragile, many times not built according to building codes, and this fact 
makes them difficult to insure even if  affordability was not an issue. However, affordability is 
also an issue, therefore Governments have the dual challenge o f (i) promoting structural measures 
to reduce the vulnerability o f  low income housing assets and (ii) improving economic welfare o f  
such communities to begin allowing a phased-in process o f risk management using the insurance 
mechanism.
Due to the above factors, it is imperative that the Government exploit to the fullest extent 
the range o f  tools available for hazard mitigation in order to reduce exposures o f low income 
dwellings, while at the same time making transparent what the Government risk liability consists of 
and what risk liabilities should be borne by the communities themselves. This sort o f strategy calls 
for a two-track approach whereby public funds for 'mitigation works' are made available to these 
communities in exchange for an explicit public insurance policy which is limited in its coverage but 
which allows low income communities to be adequately protected if  they follow the appropriate 
practices o f vulnerability reduction. Non-participating individuals or communities, while not 
completely exempt from aid in the event o f a major catastrophe, would nevertheless receive second 
priority than those homeowners who had taken pro-active measures at mitigation and who thus 
would be explicitly covered for insurance purposes and up to a specified limit, by the Government. 
Such a system would engender inter-community competition in vulnerability reduction measures 
and at the same time raise the level o f  awareness regarding the nature o f insurance policies and risk 
sharing.
6. Market implications from  hurricanes Frances and Ivan
The overall loss to the reinsurance market from hurricanes Frances and Ivan may not be 
substantial individually on the global market; however, the aggregation o f losses has impacted 
the results o f  reinsurers that are active in the Caribbean.
One o f the local insurance companies severely affected by hurricane Ivan was Dyoll 
Group Limited. The erosion o f Dyoll's capital base came principally as a result o f the reinsurance 
shortfall following a deluge o f claims arising from property damage as a result o f hurricane Ivan. 
The vast majority o f the claims originated in the Cayman Islands, amounting to $850 million, and 
contributed to the company's deficit o f  $1.1 billion, wiping out its capital base. The Jamaican 
Supreme Court granted an order in June 2005 to wind up the insurance company, because the 
claims by policyholders exceeded its reinsurance limits.
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7. The structure of the Caribbean insurance markets
The specific characteristics o f existing insurance markets need to be taken into account before 
considering the structure o f  pooled or alternative risk financing approaches. In the Caribbean 
region, the traditional insurance structure involves the proportional treaty contracted with 
reinsurers, whereby, some 70% o f written risks are 'ceded' to reinsurers who take on that 
proportion o f risks as well as the corresponding premium income.
For local insurers, however, the transfer o f  premium income collected is rewarded with 
commissions paid back by the reinsurers for bringing in and administering the client business. 
Local insurers also traditionally reinsure another 20% o f their retained risk under 'catastrophe 
excess o f  loss' (XL) treaties. These are differentiated from proportional or quota share treaties 
in that they pay no commissions and the premium rate is based on a quantification o f a 
specified limit on payable losses. XL re-insurance, thus requires a more meticulous assessment 
o f risks, exposure and actuarial probabilities. Netting the XL reinsurance cover, Caribbean 
companies tend to retain a net risk equalling about 20%-24% o f the total originally insured 
amounts.
Examining the above arrangements, the analysis shows that increased welfare in terms o f  
reducing individual country risk can be obtained through pooling such financial risks across 
different risk zones in the Caribbean. As with portfolio diversification, a larger risk pool not only 
lowers the minimum net risk capital requirement (and thus increases the surplus capital 
available), but also allows for more efficient reinsurance arrangements which can be contracted 
on a larger value base. The analysis o f insured loss potentials is a multi-disciplinary effort which 
takes into account physical weather/geological phenomena, engineering structural analysis, and 
financial loss estimation. Generally, the estimated expected loss (EPL) is a function o f all three,
i.e.
a) The probability distribution o f hazard events o f varying intensities,
b) The structural vulnerability parameters o f  buildings or physical assets subject to such
hazards, and
c) The value o f  such assets and their associated expected losses in currency terms, when
subjected to hazard events and associated structural damages.
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1. The risk m anagement system
The existence o f documented policies, plans and procedures at national and parish levels has 
allowed a consistent approach to response. Further, simulation exercises and real events have 
provided opportunities for testing and improvement o f  the system.
Information is available to decision-makers from a number o f sources. Generally, 
scientific and technical agencies, including the University o f  the West Indies, provide 
information on hazards which threaten the country. This information includes a variety o f  hazard 
and risk maps, some at regional and some at community level scales. Very importantly, this 
scientific information is translated for use at a community level in the form o f community flood 
alert systems. Less work has been done in the area o f the social and behavioural sciences, but 
statistics relating to socio-economics and demographics are available, if  to a lesser extent.
The documented history o f  impacts o f  hazards goes back over three hundred years. 
Analysis o f  this record allows a qualitative estimation o f the vulnerability o f  various communities 
to various hazards. However no quantitative methodology for vulnerability assessment has been 
developed or used in order to guide development or community vulnerability reduction 
interventions.
Adequate information is available to guide mitigation approaches. The development 
approval process presently incorporates hazard analysis, and recommendations are made for 
mitigation measures. Technical agencies can also recommend that a development not be 
approved based on the level o f  the risk faced. However, hazard risk is not the only consideration 
involved in development decisions. It is therefore rare that a development will be stopped 
because o f  the possibility o f future impact o f  hazards. There have been examples o f inadequate 
monitoring o f  the implementation o f recommended mitigation measures, leading to flooding o f  
approved developments.
The present governance structures allow risk management to be incorporated at local 
levels. Parish Councils under law have the responsibility for planning and development approvals 
within their parishes, as well as for road and drainage works. They are now being given more 
technical tools, such as hazard maps and risk analyses to guide them in their decision-making. 
The question is whether the Parish Councils have the staff and will to enforce regulations 
designed to reduce vulnerability.
Under a new proposal, Community Disaster Management Committees and Teams w ill be 
incorporated into the new Parish Development Committee structure as one o f its sub-committees. 
This will provide a development context for these groups, in addition to the preparedness and 
response functions which they presently carry out. This should allow more consistent integration 
o f hazard and vulnerability management into development at the community level.
V III. DISCUSSIONS, SCENARIOS AND RECOM M ENDATIONS
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The integrated nature o f  the Jamaican system encourages data and information exchange 
among agencies as well as decision— makers. Agencies work together on the sub-committees o f  
the National Disaster Committee during and outside o f  crises. This builds networks and 
relationships, and promotes information exchanges and discussions. There is no cost to the 
national disaster management agency for data provided by partner agencies.
In the past, the appreciation by the technical agencies o f Government, o f  the importance 
of risk reduction has not been matched at the policy and political level. More recently, however, 
and particularly after hurricane Ivan, there has been a marked increase in the acceptance o f issues 
related to vulnerability reduction and mitigation. The Planning Institute o f Jamaica has included 
risk reduction in its medium term development strategy plan, and Cabinet has agreed to various 
suggestions for reducing coastal vulnerability. Consideration is also being given to the 
delineation o f especially vulnerable areas and no-build zones.
The recent inclusion o f cost-benefit analyses by the National Works Agency (NWA) for 
their maintenance programs as well as for bridge design is also a most encouraging sign that this 
preferred culture is becoming institutionalized.
The most urgent need is for the adoption o f quantitative methods for measuring and 
tracking vulnerability and consistent risk analysis and mapping to support decision-making.
Vulnerability and risk assessments o f critical facilities and lifeline systems are urgently 
needed. This w ill require greater and more sustained inputs from the annual budget, in order that 
the dependence on project funding for the risk management program can be reduced.
Among technical agencies, access to data and information is reasonably easy. The Land 
Information Council o f  Jamaica coordinates data access and sharing for the Government agencies 
with Geographic Information Systems. Some private companies will also share data with the 
ODPEM at no cost.
Access to information by the public has been more difficult, although the use o f  websites 
to disseminate information to the public is becoming more popular. ODPEM disseminates 
information for its public information and awareness program through its website, schools, 
libraries, public lectures and workshops. The public is guaranteed the right to all but personal 
information by the Access to Information Act.
The ODPEM has placed a high level o f  emphasis on preparedness and public awareness, 
particularly sensitization o f the school-age population. This has led to the public actively seeking 
information on hazards and precautionary measures, as well as a growing number o f inquiries on 
specific hazard information for construction o f homes.
Interest in preparedness has also improved in the private sector. Support for activities such 
as Disaster Preparedness Month, Disaster Preparedness Day for Businesses and Earthquake 
Awareness Week has increased, with businesses requesting non-structural vulnerability analyses, 
earthquake and fire drills and assistance with simulation exercises and continuity planning. 
Businesses also contribute to the national program through corporate sponsorships. The role o f
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the Jamaica Institution o f Engineers in leading the current revision o f the National Building Code 
should also be noted.
The adoption o f the ECLAC methodology has allowed a thorough analysis o f economic 
impacts o f  an event. However, loss evaluation methodologies need improvement, and particularly 
the forecasting o f probable losses and rapid post-impact assessments. This will require better 
data bases for value o f  resources and property and use o f  GIS to combine the hazard information, 
financial information, probability o f occurrence, etc. to produce loss estimates. Probable loss 
estimates would allow rapid post impact assessments, with field work essentially verifying 
projections.
Jamaica has successfully integrated public, private, technical, scientific and voluntary 
sectors as well as local Government authorities and communities into its disaster risk 
management structure, and therefore represents a good example o f  an integrated approach to risk 
management. The inclusion o f mitigation in the national medium term development plan also 
indicates that there is a real effort to integrate risk reduction into national development.
Despite the above, however, there is room for improvement, and recommendations are 
made here for the future direction and improvement o f the programme:
a) Preparedness
Although a high level o f  preparedness presently exists in the risk management system, there is 
the need for improvements in the following areas:
• Simulation exercises should be regularly organized, particularly at the parish level. This 
will allow participants to become familiar with plans, roles and responsibilities. ODPEM 
should be given adequate funding in its budget to carry out one exercise per parish until 
the parishes assume this responsibility in a satisfactory way.
• Community preparedness interventions, including the establishment o f  community early 
warning systems, should be expanded, and these should be funded under the national 
budget, in addition to any funding received through projects.
• Em ergency stocks should be increased to a level adequate to provide for, at minimum, a 
category two hurricane event.
• There is urgent need for a workable plan for supplying water should the primary 
storage reservoirs be lost. This plan must provide for adequate supplies to hospitals.
• Community centres should be designed primarily as shelters, and should be able to 
withstand high magnitude events. Existing community centres should be retrofitted to act 
as shelters.
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• The National Disaster Fund should receive annual inputs from the Government in order 
to achieve a specified target within three (3) years. This target can be calculated based on 
the amounts spent on response, relief and rehabilitation over the last five years.
b) Em ergency Response
Training is urgently needed for the Fire Services in Urban Heavy Rescue. This training should 
also be offered to the National Works Agency, the Parish Councils, the Jamaica Defense Force 
and the Jamaica Institution o f Engineers.
c) Risk Reduction
• Vulnerability assessments o f  critical facilities and lifeline systems should be carried out
• A planned program  of retrofitting for these elements should be undertaken to address 
the weaknesses identified
• The national risk analysis and mapping program should be supported by the national 
budget. There should be a commitment to an annual allocation specifically for risk 
mapping o f all major hazards.
• O DPEM ’s Geographic Information Systems capacity should continue to be developed 
to allow modeling and a higher level o f  hazard analysis as well as risk mapping. 
Consideration should be given to the establishment o f a full-time GIS post within this 
agency.
• There is the need for quantitative approaches by all sectors if  risk analyses are to be 
carried out. As a start, public assets should be documented, valued and mapped. 
Vulnerability analyses and scenario -  based damage modeling should also be done.
• The Cost/Benefit analyses on mitigation measures and maintenance programs started by 
the National Works Agency should be encouraged, continued and adapted across the 
public sector.
d) Recovery
In order to facilitate the recovery process, explicit, documented procedures for ensuring that risk 
reduction approaches are integrated into the recovery process are required.
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2. Ability to cope with extreme events
a) Extreme Hurricane
i) Scenario. The scenario to be adopted for the extreme hurricane is one that can be advised by 
a review o f the most intense hurricanes to have passed through the Caribbean. Table 8.1 below  
taken from a United States Department o f  Commerce website, lists the 10 most intense tropical 
hurricanes on record, measured as a function o f central pressure. It is noted that hurricane Gilbert, 
which made a direct hit on Jamaica, is ranked second on this list. Interestingly, it retained a 
number one ranking until 2005, when hurricane Wilma took over that spot. Not surprisingly, 
Gilbert did tremendous damage to Jamaica.
Table 8.1
TOP 10 CARIBBEAN HURRICANES RANKED BY INTENSITY
Most intense Atlantic hurricanes. Intensity is measured solely by central pressure.
Rank Hurricane Season Min. pressure
1 Wilma 2005 882 mbar (hPa)
2 *Gilbert 1988 888 mbar (hPa)
3 ”Labor Day” 1935 892 mbar (hPa)
4 Rita 2005 895 mbar (hPa)
5 Allen 1980 899 mbar (hPa)
6 Katrina 2005 902 mbar (hPa)
7 Camille 1969 905 mbar (hPa)
Mitch 1998 905 mbar (hPa)
9 Ivan 2004 910 mbar (hPa)
10 Janet 1955 914 mbar (hPa)
Source: United States Department of Commerce.
It is estimated (NOAA) that hurricane Gilbert had the following characteristics:
• It resulted directly in 45 deaths
• Over 700 mm (27 inches) o f  rain fell in the mountainous areas o f Jamaica, which resulted 
in inland flash flooding
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• The hurricane resulted in the destruction o f crops, buildings, houses and roads and even 
turned small aircraft into shambles
• It severely damaged all but two medical facilities across the island
• It damaged 50% of the water supply
• Total estimated damages were approximately 2 billion dollars (2006 dollars)
• Due to its extreme intensity and path o f  destruction, the name Gilbert was retired in the 
spring o f 1989, and will never be used for another Atlantic hurricane. It was replaced by 
Gordon in the 1994 Atlantic hurricane season
Given these characteristics, the scenario that appears to be a realistic extreme one would 
be described as follows:
Strength: Category 5 hurricane approaching from the south— east (e.g. see image below).
Central Pressure: 885 mbar
Maximum Wind speeds: 185 mph sustained
ii) Discussion. The scenario hurricane could be expected to have significant impact on the 
entire population o f Jamaica, but more so for the residents and infrastructure along the south 
coast. All urban centres would be expected to be at risk, but particularly the KMA region, which 
has a wide mix o f  housing styles and resistance to hurricane winds. Outside o f  the KMA, the 
stock o f housing varies from reinforced concrete block to simple wooden structures. As a direct 
result o f the passage o f  hurricane Gilbert in 1988, the use o f hurricane straps became widespread 
in the construction industry for residential dwellings. It is to be hoped therefore that wind induced 
damage may be somewhat more contained for newer residential buildings than obtained during 
Gilbert. For commercial construction, most buildings consist o f  reinforced concrete block. 
Hurricane Ivan in 2004 left over 18,000 homeless as a result o f  flood waters and high winds, 
therefore it is to be expected that the scenario hurricane could result in a tally o f homeless
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individuals somewhere in the order o f  20,000-30,000. The emergency network would therefore 
have to gear up to accommodate these numbers in shelter locations. In summary, the wind hazard 
will have a potentially major impact on the landscape o f the country. A category 5 hurricane will 
have wind speeds above 155 mph (70 m/s). These wind speeds can be expected to have 
devastating impacts on the many low income houses that exist in the inner city communities, as 
well as several o f the rural communities. Unless properly fasted to rafters, many roofs would be 
removed and the occupants o f  these homes exposed to the elements. In hilly regions, the wind 
velocities could be amplified, making the impacts worse, as the wind will accelerate while going 
up and over hills.
For the scenario hurricane, depending on the expected surge height and actual approach 
direction, the immediate coastline areas o f  St Thomas, Kingston, St Catherine and Clarendon 
would likely have to be evacuated. The two figures following, Figures 8.1 and 8.2 (taken from an 
ongoing Smith Warner International project, sponsored by the IDB and CDERA) show the 
predicted storm surge for the Kingston and Portmore areas respectively for the one in 150 year 
return period event. This is considered to be a very infrequent event, which would be equivalent 
to a strong Category 5 hurricane, and is therefore not dissimilar from the scenario hurricane. The 
maps show that the coastal strip o f Kingston would be inundated, as would the access road to the 
international airport. This coastal strip includes many inner-city communities, which are 
vulnerable, as they do not have updated infrastructure that may be capable o f withstanding a 
natural disaster o f this magnitude. It is uncertain whether or not the airport itself would be 
submerged, as there are believed to be some inconsistencies in the elevation data for this facility, 
however it is expected that the runway would be under water and closed for perhaps a few days.
For the Portmore area (Figure 8.2 following), which is perhaps the most densely 
populated area located on the south coast o f Jamaica exposed to this hazard, the mapping shows 
that a significant part o f this community (adjacent to Kingston Harbour) would have to be 
evacuated. Other low lying coastal areas would also have to be evacuated.
There are however, two major challenges related to evacuation. These are:
1) The Portmore community; and
2) The ability to shelter large numbers o f  evacuees.
There is an evacuation plan for Portmore and the Portmore Disaster Committee is active 
and well organized under the leadership o f  the Mayor o f  Portmore. The Portmore Evacuation 
Plan has been exercised in a simulated test, and has been activated on several occasions. The 
actors and public are therefore familiar with it.
The major challenge with evacuating Portmore relates to the fact that most residents do 
not wish to leave -  however it can be anticipated that if  a Cat. 5 storm were approaching they 
would make the decision to move, some albeit belatedly. Traffic management would then become 
a key issue, with success hinging on the use o f the new toll road. The bottleneck which can be
expected at Marcus Garvey Drive would likely be the limiting factor on evacuation speed. Under
the Portmore Evacuation Plan, no evacuation is planned after the onset o f  tropical storm force
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winds, so if  the Portmore population delays evacuation it is likely that the residents will have to 
shelter on higher ground within Portmore.
Fig. 8.1
ST O R M  SU R G E M A P F O R  K IN G ST O N -1 IN 150 Y EA R  EVEN T
Kingston Harbour Region -  150-Yr Event
However, there are only a few options for shelters o f  last resort within Portmore-the 
modelling o f the storm surge levels indicates that this parameter is predicted to be higher in the 
areas o f  Hunts Bay, Waterford, Dawkins Pond and Hellshire. Other areas such as Greater 
Portmore appear to be more sheltered from inundation and therefore schools or other buildings in 
this zone could be used as refuges o f  last resort. It is expected that this decision would be made at 
the time, depending on conditions and model outputs. . However it should be noted that there is a 
possibility for extensive loss o f life in Portmore if  residents do not heed evacuation instructions.
A storm threatening Portmore would also threaten Port Royal, and so transportation is 
provided for evacuation from Port Royal. Again, residents there do not have a history o f  
evacuating when advised to do so. It is therefore highly likely that the majority o f  these residents 
would remain in Port Royal. The residents' plan is to use the old naval hospital, a raised, sturdy 
wooden structure, as the refuge o f last resort. (Carby, pers. comm. 2006). The damage to the 
Palisadoes road during hurricane Ivan, and the storm surge prediction shown in the preceding 
figures, suggest that they would most likely be cut o ff for up to two to three days.
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ST O R M  SU RG E M A P F O R  P O R T M O R E -1  IN 150 Y EA R  EVEN T
Fig. 8.2
Portmore Storm Surge
For communities outside o f  Greater Kingston, evacuation transportation is provided only 
for special needs populations, such as the disabled. It is therefore inherently assumed that most 
persons would be able to make their own arrangements to get to safe shelter. Parish Disaster 
committees usually have stand-by arrangements for transportation to be provided by owners o f  
buses.
For an evacuation o f the scale envisioned, it is expected that there would be severe 
challenges with housing evacuees, should the majority decide to go to public shelters. The total 
shelter space for Kingston is about 20,000-but supplies for that many evacuees are not routinely 
stocked. As such, evacuees are always advised to take supplies and bedding with them to shelters. 
In addition, sanitary facilities at the shelters are typically inadequate since they are not designed 
for 24 hour use. Other challenges would relate to being able to provide hot meals immediately
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after the event-since roads would still be impassable, and the provision o f water could be a 
challenge if  distribution lines were disrupted. Only some shelters have water tanks, and the 
provision o f stand-by electricity, since shelters do not have generators. Water distribution by 
trucks would have to wait until roads were cleared. Some system o f water rationing would 
therefore have to be implemented in order for the needs o f the entire affected population to be 
met.
The shelter system is highly dependent on the NGO’s and on volunteer services. Hot 
meals are usually provided by the major NGOs, but it is likely that the number o f hot meals per 
day would have to be limited, in order to ensure that all shelters could be adequately supplied 
initially.
From a management perspective, the provision o f an adequate number o f shelter 
managers is a necessity, in order to ensure adequate rest and rotation. This, however, is also 
expected to pose some challenges, as there is presently a lack o f adequately trained individuals to 
satisfy this requirement. On the other hand, fewer challenges are expected with the staffing o f  the 
NEOC, as there are adequate numbers o f  sufficiently trained personnel to accommodate a 
tw o-shift rotation at that facility.
One other point o f  note is that for isolated areas, landslides routinely cause communities 
in the hilly interior to be cut o ff from road access once there are heavy rains or an earthquake. For 
a low frequency event, airlift capacity could be challenging, especially if  the Jamaica Defence 
Force helicopters are needed for security or medical assignments. Generally, these rural 
communities have stocks in shops for about a week. After seven days they would need to be 
re-supplied. Water is not usually a problem, since there are typically numerous unpolluted 
streams which can be accessed by these communities. As helicopter re-supplies have been 
carried out on many occasions, this is not expected to be problematic.
Challenges for the health care sector in the case o f  an extreme event (hurricane or 
earthquake), are related to the availability o f resources. Hurricanes have not been high casualty 
events over the past several decades, so existing systems have not been called upon to cope with 
mass casualties. The major problems have been related to the integrity o f structures-many 
facilities suffer leaking roofs-and supplies for vector control. It should be noted that the Mass 
Casualty Plan has been exercised on several occasions, so the actors are familiar with its 
procedures.
Other hazards that must be taken into account in a hurricane will be flooding and winds. 
Flood hazard mapping presently exists for several major rivers, however it is strongly 
recommended that the existing maps be updated and the mapping program be expanded to 
include more major rivers. A sample o f  the mapping for the Rio Cobre River is shown in Figure 
8.3 following. The mapping shows that in this case, the 100 year floods boundaries are well 
contained within the river training structures for this river at the reach where it passes the 
municipality o f  Portmore and as it enters the Hunts Bay water body adjacent to Kingston 
Harbour.
In considering an extreme hurricane scenario for Jamaica, it should be noted that even the 
most severe event is unlikely to destroy the entire country to the same degree. In real events so
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far, there have therefore been options for relocating resources from less damaged to more 
damaged areas, until external assistance has become available.
Fig. 8.3






1) Eastern Jamaica: (1) faults associated with the Blue Mountains block/Wagwater 
Belt; (2) Plantain Garden Fault; (3) Extension o f the South coast Fault offshore Kingston/Bull 
Bay; (4) North Jamaica fault offshore Western Portland/Eastern St. Mary
2) Central Jamaica: (5) Spur Tree or Santa Cruz Fault; (6) Rio Minho— Crawle River 
Fault or splays; (7) South Coast Fault
3) Western Jamaica: (8) Montpelier—Newmarket Fault; (9) Duanvale Fault; (10) 
Maryland Fault; (11) Extension o f the South coast fault offshore Black River to the west
Ground Acceleration (Spectral):
At short periods (0.2 second) horizontal ground motion o f 40%— 70% o f gravity (0.4g—  
0.7g) is predicted out to about 20 km from the epicentre. These areas will experience intensity IX 
to X on the European Macroseismic Scale (EMS— 1998). The long period (1s) effect is lower 
(Jamaica Spectral Seismic Hazard Maps, 2006). Beyond the meizoseismal zone intensities will 
fall to IX and then VIII over distances o f 20— 40 kilometers. Note that site effects can amplify 
the accelerations stated above by up to 1.5 times (Wiggins— Grandison, Kebeasy & Husebye, 
2003; OAS/CDMP Seismic Hazard Report on Kingston, 1999).
(*The EM S scale may be observed or downloaded from  website http://www. sfz— 
potsdam.de/pb5/pb53/projekt/ems/).
ii) Preamble
Earthquakes can cause damage to life and property in several ways. These may occur through:
1) Being directly on a surface fault break;
2) Being near enough to the fault to experience the direct heave o f the hanging wall marked 
by very high ground velocity and acceleration;
3) Ground shaking associated with passing seismic waves, especially the shear and surface 
waves;
4) Amplified ground movement caused by alluvial ground with or without accompanying 
settlement, fissures and/or liquefaction;
5) Triggered landslides and/or tsunamis.
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O f the effects described above, (3) is the most prevalent in Jamaica, and is the only effect 
predicted by standard seismic hazard maps. It should be noted that effect (4) w ill be o f  
importance for Kingston, parts o f  Portmore, Black River and any place where buildings exist on 
alluvial terrain. Ground fissures, liquefaction and settlement in past earthquakes have tended to 
be confined to areas where the water table is high such as around the edges o f  harbors and in 
zones o f  reclaimed land. Often ground settlement is also associated with man— made 
embankments such as approaches to bridges etc. Landslides and rock falls o f  varying sizes 
typically litter the mountainous landscape following a significant earthquake.
Tsunamis were reported in harbors o f  the north and south coasts o f  Jamaica following the 
1692 and the 1907 earthquakes, which were the largest to have affected eastern Jamaica. For 
Kingston harbor all reported cases were as a result o f  local tsunamis caused by the described 
subsidence at Port Royal on each occasion.
iii) Discussion
Unlike hurricanes, the possible effects o f  earthquakes are more o f an unknown. The time o f  
occurrence, the location o f the epicentre, duration and depth are all factors which will dictate the 
level o f  effects. A review o f past earthquakes that have affected Jamaica since the Port Royal 
earthquake o f June 7th 1692 reveals that the impact o f  the earthquake on the existing landforms is 
most prominent in locations where the geology allows the most impact to occur. In other words, 
during an earthquake, it is actually the geological framework that determines where the fault 
ruptures are likely to occur, how strongly the ground will shake and the locations where 
landslides, liquefaction, etc. will be most likely to occur. It is precisely the combination o f  
relatively weak geology and reclaimed land sites, which are housing critical port (both air and 
sea) facilities that renders the KMA a location that is very vulnerable to this hazard. Mapping 
exists that shows the locations o f  measured epicentres across Jamaica and in its nearshore waters 
within the last century. The majority o f these have occurred in the vicinity o f the Wag Water 
Fault in the eastern section o f the island.
In attempting to predict the likely effects o f  a Magnitude 7 event in Jamaica it is o f  some 
import to look back at the major quakes o f the recent past and the levels o f  destruction reported. 
In Jamaica, significant earthquakes (estimated magnitudes in parentheses) occurred on: January 
14, 1907(6.9), March 1, 1957(6.5), February 26, 1978(4.5), January 13, 1993(6.1) and June 12, 
2005 (6.1). At least three o f  these were located in the eastern half o f  the island while the 1957 
event was centered in western Jamaica, though its effects were felt throughout the island.
In the case o f  the 1907 event the levels o f  destruction o f assets are difficult to compare 
with the scenario presented here, because o f  varying factors that include the quality o f buildings 
and the fact that significant losses occurred due to the fires that erupted as a result o f ruptured gas 
lines. The most reasonable event that should be examined for comparison is the recent tremor o f  
1993, for two reasons. First due to the amount o f  data collected as a result o f  this tremor and 
second because it affords the opportunity to see how buildings constructed with the benefit o f  
more recent engineering standards and codes performed.
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Ahmad and Wiggins— Grandison 12 from the Department o f  Geology and Seismic 
Research Unit (University o f  the West Indies) report that the earthquake occurred at just after 
12:11 pm local time on January 13, 1993. The tremor had a magnitude o f 5.4 and was located 
some 15 km NNE o f Half Way Tree, which is in the centre o f  the capital city o f  Kingston. They 
further reported that the following earthquake— induced geotechnical phenomena occurred:
• Ground shaking occurred for between 10 and 14 seconds, which was accompanied by 
both horizontal and vertical displacement.
• There was isolated ground failure including settlement, cracking fissures and pockets o f  
liquefaction.
• Significant landslides occurred both on— shore and in submarine regions;
• There was increased activity in some springs, notably the Rockfort Mineral Springs.
That report cites the Office o f  Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management 
(ODPEM) reporting that just over 500 families were affected island wide, many o f whom had 
structures that were either damaged or completely destroyed. There were, in addition, numerous 
cases o f  individual houses, roads, infrastructural works and other assets that suffered damage but 
by no means could the damage be said to be widespread. Insurance estimates and anecdotal 
evidence puts the total cost at around $250 million Jamaican Dollars. In fact Ahmad states in his 
paper that no comprehensive multi— disciplinary post— quake damage assessment was carried 
out, and as such the real economic cost is unknown.
One o f the reasons for this is that in several areas o f  the capital, properties whether they 
are residential or commercial are un— insured and as such without the damage assessment study 
significant losses are unrecorded. As an example individual losses in isolated sections o f  
Kingston such as August Town were higher than in most other areas. The matter is further 
complicated by the fact that in many o f these areas the housing stock may either be old or has 
been put up with minimal adherence to modern engineering practice. The August Town damage 
referred to earlier occurred in structures made o f un— reinforced block walls.
What is known is that the major engineered structures in New Kingston, the downtown 
commercial district and the air and sea— ports, performed as designed. The fact that in a city o f  
close to 850,000 inhabitants, ODPEM reported only 500 families affected, suggests that most 
structures also performed as designed.
We can use, to some extent, the damage from the 1993 event and the performance o f our 
building and infrastructural stock to try and model what would likely happen in a Magnitude 7 
event. Such an exercise involves a lot o f  assumptions about location o f the quake, its depth and
12 (Ahmad, Rafi, 1993 The Jamaica Earthquake of 1993: Geology and Geotechnical
aspects-The Journal of the Geological Society of Jamaica Wiggins-Grandison, Margaret, 1993 -The 
Earthquake of January 13, 1993- Newsletter, The Jamaican Society of Scientists and Technologists)
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other parameters. However, given that a Magnitude 7 earthquake would release almost 900 times 
the energy o f the 1993 event and assuming an eastern epicentre (i.e. in the Wag Water belt) we 
could expect the following:
• More significant and longer ground shaking than the 10 to 14 seconds o f  1993, and 
greater horizontal and vertical displacement.
• Widespread ground failure including settlement, cracking, fissures and pockets o f  
liquefaction leading to significant structural damage in buildings and houses not built to 
code. In some areas localised geological factors may lead to damage to structures built to 
code and though containment may prevent loss o f life, many structures would be 
irreparable.
• Landslides in vulnerable areas such as Jacks Hill, Papine, Norbrook, Gordon Town, Irish 
Town, and Upper Hope Pastures (all in the northern KMA region) are expected to be 
massive and depending on the time o f day may result in serious casualties. It must be 
remembered that a 1988 quake cut the Jacks Hill Main Road in two and caused the 
collapse o f  one large dwelling house.
• Significant damage to the road network particularly in the landslide prone areas 
mentioned above.
• Submarine landslips may occur either damaging or cutting off our major air and seaports.
• Fissures and liquefaction features around harbours and lakes/ponds.
• Springs such as Rockfort may either increase or decrease in flow volume causing flooding 
in the former case.
• Newly formed land on the south and east sides o f  Port Royal would be prone to 
subsidence.
• Damage to abutments and bridge approaches, which become vulnerable at high intensities 
due to ground failure or shifting o f  the structure off o f  the abutments.
• Power failure in the worst affected zones.
• Water supply pipes may break or be disconnected at the joints, wherever weakest.
• The marine telephone cables o ff the Bull Bay coast will break for an eastern Jamaica 
epicentre as has happened in the past, even in 1993.
• Damage to the port o f  Kingston.
• Disturbance o f  bottom sediments in Kingston Harbour which would affect the shipping 
channel.
Possible damage to power generation facilities in Kingston.
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The aforementioned major structures in New Kingston and Downtown such as the 
Pegasus Hotel and the Bank o f Jamaica Building are likely to survive such an event, although 
minor structural damage is a distinct possibility. Geological conditions at our major ports also 
make them more vulnerable and the generality o f the housing stock and infrastructural assets also 
represent likely areas o f significant damage. Loss o f human life w ill largely be a function o f the 
time o f day when the earthquake occurs and all indications suggest that a nighttime tremor could 
involve significant casualties. The ability o f  the Government agencies to respond in terms o f fire 
and rescue, hospitals, food and shelter provision and general emergency response is expected to 
be severely restricted.
There is an existing earthquake plan 13 which sets out the procedures to be followed in the 
event o f an earthquake, including inspection o f buildings, management o f  debris and emergency 
medical care among others. However, there is no recent experience in managing the effects o f  a 
major earthquake, a fact which is very important. It is possible, however, to consider some worst 
case scenarios resulting from a strong earthquake with a magnitude o f  7 with respect to the 
disaster management agencies, and these are examined here.
1) The Collapse o f  Large Structures
The fire service is not trained in the skills o f  urban heavy rescue, so search and rescue efforts 
within large collapsed structures will be difficult. On the positive side however, modern multi—  
storey structures are designed by qualified engineers who take into account the Building Code 
and earthquake resistant requirements, so the likelihood o f large— scale structural collapses is 
minimized. Fire fighting will be hampered by disruptions to the water distribution systems. 
Fortunately however, there are many other sources o f water such as swimming pools, which 
could be used. In addition, the Fire Service routinely uses water trucks to provide additional 
water during fire— fighting operations.
2) Loss o f  Major Water Storage Facilities
Catastrophic loss o f  either the Hermitage or Mona reservoirs would be devastating, and can be 
expected to cause high loss o f life in the heavily populated communities below these reservoirs, 
as there is no real— time warning system for failure. Unfortunately operations would likely be 
concentrated on recovery rather that search and rescue in such a situation. N o modelling or 
quantitative risk analysis has been done to assess the risk o f  such a loss.
The provision o f water in such circumstances will be a major problem. Water would have 
to be trucked into the KMA region from adjoining parishes, which would be a slow and costly 
venture. It is expected that there will be some stored water since many households do have tanks. 
However those tanks which survive the shaking will provide water for at most a week, if  that 
long. Disruption o f sewage lines will also likely occur, posing possible threats to health and
13 Carby, Barbara E. A scientific basis for earthquake contingency planning: an example from 
Jamaica. Proceedings, 4th International Conference on Civil Engineering, May 4-6, 1997, Sharif 
University of Technology, Tehran, I.R. Iran, Volume 1 Structural Engineering, pp 345-355
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causing contamination o f piped water where these systems survive and may be adjacent to one 
another. Fortunately, most o f  the public is aware o f  how to treat contaminated water for drinking 
through the use o f  bleach and/or boiling o f water.
Experience has shown that in earthquakes most rescues are performed by the persons at 
the scene. In this regard there are expected to be plenty o f willing hands, some o f whom would 
have been trained as members o f community disaster committees and response teams. Since 
residential structures in low income areas tend to be lightweight, one can expect fewer deaths in 
these areas. However there is an unfortunate culture o f  adding vertically to one storey houses 
without engineering advice. This may result in collapse o f these structures in middle income 
areas. Since these structures are made from concrete blocks, there is the likelihood o f serious 
injury.
Challenges to health care will be from lack o f adequate supplies for treatment o f  injuries, 
since public hospitals are already stretched to capacity in the management o f  day to day injuries. 
The other problem area will be the state o f the medical facilities, many o f which are housed in 
older structures. As no vulnerability analysis o f these structures has been done, the full effects 
cannot be anticipated. However since no non— structural mitigation measures have been put in 
place, it is likely that there will be considerable damage to non— structural elements, which could 
render a facility useless even if  it survives the earthquake. On the positive side there is a pool o f  
highly skilled and trained medical personnel available, and there is a mass casualty plan in place 
which includes the coordination o f the private health care providers.
One potential problem area for hospitals is the provision o f water. The volumes o f water 
used by the large hospitals means it is economically impractical to have storage adequate for any 
prolonged period. This means that if  the major national storage systems are lost, a high 
percentage o f  the emergency water supply system will have to be dedicated to keeping hospitals 
functioning.
The mass casualty plan calls for the use o f  refrigerated containers for storing bodies 
should morgues be full. Mass burial is not regarded as a primary option, but rather as a last resort.
The problem o f isolated communities mentioned above would also occur in an 
earthquake. Fortunately however, in an earthquake food supplies on and in the ground would not 
be affected, so no shortage o f basic food is anticipated.
There is an established procedure for restoring road access after any event. This includes 
pre-positioning o f  equipment and the use o f contractors. Delays usually occur where there is the 
need for rebuilding o f roadways and bridges, especially in steep or hilly terrain. On the whole, 
restoration o f access ways along main highways would generally be completed within a period o f  
days if  bridges and retaining walls were intact.
The secondary effects o f  an earthquake have implications which also need to be 
considered. Disturbance o f the harbour could mean that ships would not be able to enter until the 
channel had been surveyed and re-established. The container port is located on reclaimed 
landfill, which could be prone to liquefaction under earthquake loading. This means that trade 
would be affected for longer periods than in a post-hurricane situation. The effects on the
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Norman Manley International Airport, and most importantly the runway, are also an unknown. 
As an example, in the Kobe earthquake, properly engineered fill areas did do well. Survival o f  the 
runway will therefore depend on its engineering design. Extensive damage to the Norman 
Manley International Airport would leave Montego Bay's Sangster International Airport as the 
only port o f  entry for relief supplies coming in by air. Supplies could then be moved by road into 
Kingston.
The cement factory, the bauxite and power generation plants and the flour mill, could all 
suffer damages to machinery, which could put them out o f production for long periods o f time. 
This in turn could lead to negative macro-economic impacts.
c) Observations
In summary, the following observations are offered:
• A low frequency, high-magnitude event would certainly pose severe challenges for the 
emergency management system. As became evident in New Orleans, things can go very 
wrong very quickly, even when resources are available.
• The emergency management procedures in Jamaica are well documented and personnel 
are trained. However, much will depend on:
o The level o f  damage occasioned,
o The loss o f  emergency management personnel -  have they escaped injury, can 
they report for duties, etc.
o The reaction o f the population, especially in a post-earthquake scenario where 
there is no previous experience, and on
o The ability o f  the emergency management personnel to adapt and think on their 
feet.
A listing o f hazard management activities, that are driven by existing plans and policies, is 
given in Table 8.2 following.
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Table 8.2.
SUMMARY OF HAZARD MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES FROM PLANS AND POLICIES FOR JAMAICA
Situation Mitigation Preparedness Response Recovery
Roads Impassable Roads alreadyexist
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Event Varies according to hazard
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testing,
Training of personnel 
Establish Agreements







with Include private Restockprivate hospitals providers in 
response
This table summarizes the actions to be taken in managing various situations according to 
the policies and procedures laid out in the National Disaster Plan and Mitigation Policy for 
Jamaica, as well as in plans o f  utility companies, the Ministry o f  Health and other members o f  the 
National Response Team It should be noted that these situations can arise from a variety o f  
hazards, and as such are not hazard specific. A list o f relevant plans and policies for Jamaica is 
given in Appendix III.
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3. W orkshop recommendations
A second workshop was held on 9th November, 2006 at the offices o f  the Planning Institute o f  
Jamaica (PIOJ), the Government o f  Jamaica agency responsible for setting planning policy at a 
national level. Following the main presentations, a period o f general discussions ensued. During 
the various discussions and debates the following points were raised, which are presented here in 
the context o f recommendations that should be considered for implementation in order to 
improve the overall disaster management process:
o The appropriateness o f using schools as shelters versus the use o f other multi-use structures 
was questioned. This issue was raised since the damage to school property resulting from 
shelter inhabitants was often greater than the damage resulting from the disaster. In 
addition, the delay in getting children back to school, until repairs were made, was 
problematic.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  Government agencies should move towards the use o f  
designated multi-use areas in schools only, such as gymnasia.
o Disaster mitigation and vulnerability reduction plans that are prepared at the Parish level 
are not always well known at the community level, as the dissemination o f information 
does not always work well.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  Establish fluent and well working lines o f  
communication between ODPEM, the Parish Councils and the communities.
o The recovery efforts and in particular the distribution o f relief supplies has occasionally 
been hindered by political interference.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  In spite o f  this factor, technicians should try to act in 
accordance with the previously developed disaster management plans.
o The distribution o f risk mapping was not widespread and therefore mitigation actions, 
such as relocation, were not always easy to be implemented.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  Ensure that parish and community representatives work 
with populations at risk to advise them o f  the dangers inherent in remaining in 
dangerous areas. Support this work, wherever possible, with available mapping at 
a scale that can be easily understood and appreciated by the people in the 
communities.
o The location o f critical facilities such as the fire station was often in hazardous zones. An 
example was cited o f  the destruction o f a Fire Station during the passage o f hurricane 
Allen in 1980.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  Ensure that any new critical facility is sited outside o f  
the zone o f  maximum hazards, in accordance with available risk mapping. Where
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such mapping is not available, it should be carried out prior to the selection o f  a 
location fo r  the facility in question.
o The National Disaster Fund (NDF) even though topped up by the Government in 2005, 
remains at an insufficient level.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  Develop a relationship between the magnitude o f  the 
fund  and the annualized estimate o f  disaster damage based on historical 
assessment. This approach may reinforce fo r  the policy makers the relationship 
between the required size o f  the fund  and the average annual requirements fo r  
mitigating natural disasters.
o There is a major problem relating to the lack o f insurance for public infrastructure. The 
Government has opted to be its own insurer, however, often after a disaster, there are 
insufficient funds to carry out this mandate.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  Government should move immediately to insure its 
infrastructure. This insurance should be placed in a manner that takes advantage 
o f  the considerable amount o f  infrastructure that will need to be insured. This 
approach could result in more affordable premiums.
o ODPEM now has a National Hazard Risk Reduction Policy
o Donor agencies have expressed the viewpoint that “mitigation does not attract a lot o f  
recognition, whereas the provision o f aid after an event does”.
> R E C O M M E N D A T I O N  -  There is a need to recognize the importance o f  
mitigation actions in a manner that is acknowledged on the international stage 
and also by the political decision makers.
Other conclusions reached/recommendations made included:
o The results o f the final component o f the project should be disseminated throughout the 
five countries, as agencies will be able to draw on the positive experiences from other 
countries.
o The involvement o f the communities is an essential ingredient to the proper operation o f  
the disaster management system.
o Risk transfers for public sector infrastructure should be increased.
o There is presently insufficient mapping and methodology to represent and define 
vulnerability for all areas o f Jamaica.
o There is strong public perception o f risk from natural hazards, as a result o f  relatively 
recent events. The fact that the Planning Institute o f Jamaica was the host o f  the workshop 
is evidence o f the importance o f this topic to the national fabric.
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o There was unanimous agreement that there needs to be more communication between the 
political directorate and the technocrats and disaster managers, to ensure a smoother flow  
in the distribution o f relief supplies.
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ECONOMIC OVERVIEW -  HURRICANE IVAN
Economic Sector Losses -  Hurricane Ivan
A detailed loss assessment was conducted after Hurricane Ivan using the ECLAC methodology, 
compiled approximately one month after the event. The productive sectors -  including agriculture 
and livestock, food processing, mining, commerce and tourism -  sustained significant damage 
and losses. The disaster impact on each o f the productive sectors is described below.
A. Agriculture and livestock
While agriculture and livestock production had grown by a sizable 5.7 % in 2003 over the 
previous year’s, below normal rainfall had in fact produced a decline in the sector’s gross 
domestic production in the first half o f  2004. This reduction was due to the presence o f  dry 
conditions in the central and western parishes, which is where crops for domestic consumption 
are produced and experienced a drop o f around 6.5 %. Traditional agricultural exports, however, 
had shown a vigorous growth in the first half o f  2004, when a 7.7 % increase in gross output was 
registered, recuperating from a steady decline in the past ten years.
Hurricane Ivan brought about strong winds, heavy rainfall and floods that affected the 
assets and production o f the agriculture and livestock sector. Winds broke, bent and uprooted 
plants and trees; excessive humidity and water logging o f  soils also affected crops and 
plantations; winds and floods destroyed or damaged the sector’s infrastructure.
The following is a brief account o f  the damage and losses sustained by both the domestic 
and export oriented activities in the sector.
Domestic production
Due to the action o f strong winds and floods, physical infrastructure and equipment for 
the agriculture and livestock sector -  including farm buildings and equipment, farm roads, 
irrigation equipment, etc. -  sustained significant damage and destruction, as were also large 
extensions o f  permanent plantations whose trees were broken or uprooted. Losses o f lands due to 
the action o f upstream erosion and to silting were not significant in extension and value, when 
compared to production losses. Most affected parishes were those o f St. Catherine, Clarendon, 
Manchester, St. James, Hanover and St. Mary.
In regard to crops, losses occurred in the production o f vegetables, fruits, banana and 
plantains, ground provisions and tree crops for domestic consumption. In the case o f  livestock, 
poultry, goats and pigs were most affected and milk production has decreased due to the death o f  
dairy cattle.
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Based on a preliminary survey o f  damage and losses conducted by the Ministry of  
Agriculture, it has been estimated that a total o f  11,100 hectares o f  agricultural producing land 
were affected in one way or another, and that a total o f  117,700 farmers sustained damages and 
losses.
The apiculture, fisheries and aquaculture activities also sustained significant damage and 
losses. Many trees that provided food for honeybee activities were destroyed and production o f  
honey was affected. The action o f the sea, through storm surge, caused severe damages to coastal 
line resources and to artisan and industrial fishery fleets and equipment. The catch o f fish 
temporarily declined as a combined result o f  the reduced fleet capacity and o f the migration o f  
fish to other places where food was available. Finally, ponds used for aquaculture sustained 
damage; fish stock and inputs were destroyed. Details o f  damage and loss estimates for this 
sector are included in Table 6.1.
Traditional export production
Bananas The winds o f Hurricane Ivan inflicted heavy damage to virtually the entire area 
devoted to banana plantations in Jamaica, which is most evident in the parishes o f  St. Mary, 
Portland St. James and St. Thomas. Trees were broken or uprooted in an estimated surface area o f  
4,272 hectares and the entire production o f bananas both for export and for domestic 
consumption has been lost. This is a very serious setback for these activities that had managed to 
increase output by 1.4 % in the first half o f 2004.
It is anticipated that the plantations can be resuscitated and that full production would be 
achieved in a period o f 6 to 9 months, during which no significant production was obtained. In 
addition to the loss o f  production over the stated period, there was expected to be a negative 
impact on employment. Other than the limited labour that was required for the rehabilitation of  
the plants and farms, nearly 8,000 persons were out o f  work for the aforementioned period in the 
export oriented activities.
As the new banana plants reach maturity and begin production, workers w ill be able to 
return in a staged fashion. Direct damage to export banana plantations exclusively, can be 
measured by the cost o f  resuscitating the plants in 2,226 hectares, using unit costs derived by the 
Banana Export Company Limited. These damages were estimated as J$ 278.35 million. Losses in 
production over the next six to nine months, while the plantations are being resuscitated, have 
been estimated as J$ 930 million. O f that figure, approximately J$ 400 will represent losses 
sustained in the present year, and the $530 w ill occur in 2005. This will have a negative impact 
on the balance o f  payments as they represent exports that will not be made to the tune o f  15 
million dollars.
In summary, the total impact on the banana export activities will reach $1,208.35 million, 
of which $278.35 million (22 %) are direct damages and $930 million are indirect losses that will 
accrue in the present and following year (see Table 6.1).
Coffee The strong winds accompanying Hurricane Ivan affected the uplands where coffee 
is grown in the island. They caused the breaking up or uprooting o f coffee trees as well as 
damage to the forest that provides shading to the plantation. In addition, the winds caused the loss
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o f berries for the current crop in the Blue Mountain and lowland coffee areas. This caused a 
major setback to the increased coffee production that had been achieved in recent times as a 
result o f  major resuscitation o f coffee tree activities by farmers. The destruction o f 5 % o f the 
coffee tree population has been estimated at a value o f  $992 million. This figure was arrived at by 
estimating the value o f  new plants for an estimated area o f  2225 acres as well as the rehabilitation 
o f plants and lands in 2630 more acres. It is to be noted that the new coffee trees w ill only begin 
producing after a three to five year period, when they reach maturity. The winds caused the loss 
o f berries in nearly 45 % o f the coffee-producing area. It has been estimated that this will impede 
the production and export o f  213,000 boxes o f  Blue Mountain coffee and 41,000 boxes o f  lower 
quality coffee. Combined with a respective value o f  $2050 and $ 951 per box, this w ill translate 
into a loss o f  $475.7 million in export earnings that will have a negative impact o f  8 million 
dollars in the country’s balance o f payments for 2004.
In addition to the above, a further indirect loss o f  $97.6 million is anticipated for at least 
the following three calendar years until the new trees reach maturity. In addition, there exists an 
insurance scheme for the sector. Insurance is available for coffee production, provided the losses 
occur after berries are present on the trees, at a rate o f  20 dollars per box for the case o f  Blue 
Mountain coffee and 12 dollars per box for lowland quality coffee, to a combined maximum 
amount o f 8.8 million dollars. Since Hurricane Ivan, however, a significant number o f the coffee 
trees have not been insured since the premiums are considered to be too high. Reinsurance is 
available from a number o f large international insurance groups including Munich Re and others 
-  whenever the losses exceed 20 % o f the expected crop.
Although on this occasion insurance proceeds w ill assist the coffee growers to recover 
part o f  their losses, it is noted that some producers that were already considering their withdrawal 
from this activity due to the low international prices, and have now decided not to continue their 
production.
It is estimated that the coffee production activity sustained direct damage amounting to $992 
million and total indirect losses o f $768.5 million, bringing the total amount o f  the impact to 
$1,760.5 million. The indirect losses w ill have a corresponding negative impact on the balance o f  
payments in view o f the reduction in exports that is anticipated, and also a positive consequence 
due to the amount o f expected reinsurance reimbursements (see Table 6.1). It is also to be noted, 
that the overall impact o f  this disaster is not restricted to the year o f  occurrence, but will have 
medium term consequences due to the destruction o f the coffee trees.
Sugar Cane The strong winds and the floods ensuing from the heavy rainfall affected 
export activities, at a time when efforts were being made to increase the area o f  recently planted 
fields, to improve reaping conditions and to increase the sugar-to-cane production ratio. Sugar 
canes were broken and uprooted in significant extensions, and flooding affected extensive areas. 
In addition, miscellaneous infrastructure and irrigation systems sustained damage and 
destruction. Furthermore, future production in both the public and private sectors were expected 
to decrease, based on preliminary data (supplied by the Sugar Company o f Jamaica) that covers 
approximately 7 0 - 75 % o f the entire sugar industry in the country, and which was expected to 
result in an estimated loss o f  190,000 tons o f  cane, or 15.6 % o f last year’s production. It is 
estimated that the direct damage to infrastructure and plantations amount to $521.9 million, and 
that indirect production losses to the cane producers will reach $365.3 million. The total impact
103
o f  the disaster caused by Ivan in these activities w ill thus be $887.2 million (see Table 6.1). It is 
to be noted that there w ill occur corresponding losses for the processing o f  cane and its 
conversion into sugar, which loss w ill be accounted for in the Manufacturing sector.
Damage and Losses in the Agriculture and Livestock sector 
(SMillion)
Impacts on the external sector
Sector and subsector Total Direct Indirect Increase in Decrease in
damage damage losses imports exports
Total 8.550.1 3.407.0 5,143.0 440 2,784
1. Agriculture 7,132.4 2,200.4 4.992 0 230 2.784






Bananas 522.0 120.4 401.6
Plantains 341.0 78.7 262.3
Grain provisions (Tubers) 570.6 570.6
Tree crops 416.5 416.5
Others 12.2 12.2
1.2 Traditional Exports production 4.553.7 2.001.3 2,5584 2.784
Bananas 1.208.4 278.4 930.0 930
Coffee 1.760.5 992.0 768.5 769
Sugar cane SS7.2 521.9 365.3 591
Cocoa 27.6 27.6 2S
Pimiento 351.0 209.0 142.0 142
Citrus 325.0 325.0 325




Cattle (beef) 2S.0 28.0




Milk production 26.0 26.0
Colonies and hones'production 127.6 2.6 125.0
3. Fisheries 342.0 342.0 210
Fishenes 306.0 306.0
Aquaculture 36.0 36.0




Irrigation Systems 88.9 88.9
Source: ECLAC estimates, based on information from official sources and private sector enterprises.
Cocoa Efforts were being made in 2003 to increase production to take advantage o f  
increasing international prices and demand o f  the product. However, the scarcity o f  rains in the 
first half o f 2004 resulted in a declined production (by 47.7 %), especially in Clarendon and St. 
Mary, the main cocoa producing parishes in the island. The hurricane damaged the trees and
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compromised the corresponding future production o f cocoa in an area o f 1100 hectares (2700 
acres), thus compounding the problems o f the farmers. While the trees are expected to recover 
promptly, an estimated loss in production o f $27.6 million is expected for 2004 due exclusively 
to the action o f the hurricane. This figure represents a loss o f foreign exchange earnings and the 
likelihood o f losing some international markets, if  production is not restored promptly.
Pimento The physical infrastructure, including warehouses and equipment, and stocks of  
pimento already processed were damaged or destroyed. On the other hand, some trees were 
destroyed and berries were lost. Estimates indicate that direct damage amounted to $209 million 
and that losses in future production would reach $142 million, thus bringing the total effects on 
the pimento activity to $351 million (see Table 6.1). These losses were expected to have a 
bearing on the Manufacturing and Export sectors.
Citrus The action o f the strong winds caused the loss o f  many fruits that were in varying 
degrees o f  ripening, especially in St. Catherine and Clarendon. It has been estimated that these 
losses are equivalent to 35 % of the expected production for the remainder o f  the year for this 
crop. These indirect losses amount to $ 325 million (see Table 6.1).
Summary - Agriculture
The overall impact o f  Hurricane Ivan on the Agriculture and Livestock sector, after including 
damage to its infrastructure and machinery, has been estimated at $8,550 million or its equivalent 
o f 137.9 million dollars, o f  which direct damage are $3,407 million (40 %) and indirect losses are 
$5143 million (60 %). See Table 6.1.
B. M anufacturing
The Manufacturing and Processing sector had been performing well in the second quarter o f  
2004, as indicated by a 6.8 % growth o f its real GDP compared with 2003. Hurricane Ivan was 
expected to have a negative effect on the Food Processing sub sector, since there would be lower 
volumes o f domestic agriculture and livestock products to process due to the damage and losses 
in the primary sector. While no comprehensive damage and loss assessments were completed up 
to the time o f the preparation o f the evaluation, sufficient information was available to the 
ECLAC team to make order-of-magnitude estimations o f the sector’s expected performance in 
2004 and 2005 as a result o f  the disaster. The Jamaica Manufacturer’s Association conducted a 
survey that indicated that 5 % o f the associates sustained significant damage to their 
infrastructure, machinery and stocks o f  products. A preliminary estimate put those direct 
damages at $210 million.
In addition to those direct damages, due to the temporary absence o f  electricity and water, 
the entire Food Processing sector sustained production losses for a limited time. After electricity 
was restored, other problems prevented them from achieving full operational capacity. It has been 
conservatively estimated that an average o f five production days were lost as a result. 
Furthermore, the reduction in raw material inputs, due to the losses sustained in the Agriculture 
and Livestock sector brought about significant production losses for the Manufacturing sector.
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These losses were estimated on the basis o f  the following components: decline in the processing 
of agricultural and livestock products earmarked for the domestic markets; reduction in the 
processing o f  fresh products for export; and a decline in the production o f sugar.
For the first component, a study was made to determine the fraction o f item-by-item food 
production that is normally retained by the farmers for local consumption and that should not 
reach the processing plants and domestic markets. Volumes o f  the production o f each product 
that were to reach the market and would not be available due to the disaster were subsequently 
estimated. Then, based on an analysis o f  wholesale market and farm gate prices, estimates were 
made to determine the added value o f  food processing that would not be forthcoming due to the 
loss in agricultural production. While it is recognized that this was an indirect manner to arrive at 
the processing sector loss, results thus obtained were indicative o f  the negative effect in this 
sector. In addition, an order-of-magnitude estimate was made o f losses that would arise in 
processing poultry and other livestock products.
-2
D a m a g e  a n d  L o s s e s  in  th e  F o o d -M a n u fa c tu r in g  s e c to r  o f  J a m a ic a  
(S M il lio n )
Component Damage and losses Sector Effect on 
exportsTotal Direct Indirect Public 1Private
Total 2,204.9 210.0 1,994.9 312.1 1,892.8 659.5
Infrastructure.
machinery and 210.0 210.0 . . . 210.0
stocks
Domestic sector —
processing loss 603.9 . . . 603 9 603.9
- Agriculture 421.9 421.9 421.9
- Livestock 1S2.0 182.0 182.0
Export oriented loss SS5.0 . . . S85.0 161.1 723.9 659.5
- Sugar 225.5 225.5 161.1 64.4
- Food 659.5 659.5 659 5 659.5
Overall production 506.0 . . . 506.0 151.0 355.0
activity reduction
Source: Estimated by ECLAC on the basis o f  official and private sector information.
In regard to the second loss component, which was based on a sample survey conducted 
by the Jamaica Exporters Association, a forecast was made on the loss o f  revenue that would be 
sustained in the six months following the hurricane due to the unavailability o f  fresh products for 
processing and export. In the third component, estimates were made o f the losses for the sugar 
processing plants based on the volume o f sugarcane that was lost and in combination with the 
expected sugar/cane ratio and the prevailing price o f sugar.
In summary, it can be stated that Hurricane Ivan imposed total damage and losses o f  $ 
2205 million (US$35.6 million) to the Food Processing sector, o f  which $1995 million were 
indirect (90 % o f the total) and $210 million direct damages. Furthermore, these losses were 
expected to translate into a negative effect on the country’s balance o f  payments due to the 
decrease in exports to the tune o f $660 million or 10.6 million dollars (see Table 6.2).
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The growing world demand for aluminium has caused a sustained growth in the Mining sector o f  
Jamaica, so that its gross domestic product grew by 4.9 % in 2003. In the first half o f  2004, the 
utilized production capacity in the alumina plants was 100.2 % and 95.7 % in the bauxite plants. 
The Jamaica Bauxite Institute had envisaged a 10 % increase o f  production for the present year, 
before the hurricane struck. Production at some o f the sector plants was only interrupted for a 
short period o f time before and after the hurricane struck, and the plants only sustained slight 
damage in non- essential components. Full production operations were resumed shortly after the 
hurricane. While damage to the plants' infrastructure and quarrying sites was relatively minor, 
Ivan’s winds and storm surge caused the destruction o f sections o f  port, conveyance and loading 
facilities in at least two locations (Photo 6.1), so that export operations were affected. Use is 
presently being made o f an alternative port, to expedite exports.
Photo  6.1
C. M ining sector
DA M A G E T O  LO A D IN G  FA C IL IT Y
Preliminary estimates, pending more detailed assessments for insurance purposes, 
indicate that direct damage to infrastructure, mainly port related facilities, amounted to $50 
million. Estimates o f  indirect losses were made taking into consideration the temporary stoppage 
o f production o f all plants over a period o f five days. It was considered that it would be nearly 
impossible to recover these production losses in the remainder o f  the year since the plants were 
operating at nearly 100 % o f their capacity. The very high daily production achieved in the 
months o f  July and August, just prior to the disaster, was used as a basis to project the losses in 
the above-mentioned five-day period. The increased operational costs due to the damage in port 
and related facilities were not deemed significant. The indirect losses were quantified as $980
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million, which would have had a corresponding impact on the external sector on account o f  
exports that would not be made in the present year.
The total impact o f the disaster on the sector amounted to $1030 million, or its equivalent 
o f  16.6 million dollars. Indirect losses represented 95.0 % o f the total impact. The overall impact 
o f  these damages and losses in the external sector accounts included $980 million (US$15.8 
million) in lost exports and $32 million (US$0.5 million) in imports o f  materials and equipment 
to replace damaged infrastructure (see Table 6.3).
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E s t im a te d  I m p a c t  o f  th e  H u r r ic a n e  o n  th e  M in in g  S e c to r  o f  J a m a ic a  
( S M il l io n )
Component Dam age and losses Sector Effect on  
external 
sector
Total Damage L osses Public Private
Total 1,030.0 50.0 980.0 — 1.030
Infrastructure 50.0 50.0 — 32.0
Production 980.0 — 980.0 980.0
Source: Estimates made b y  ECLAC on the basis o f  official and private sector information.
D. Com m erce sector
The Food, Beverages and Tobacco sub-sector, which represents 15 % o f total sales in the 
Distributive Trade sector, experienced a 12.2 % downturn in sales in the first half o f  2004, 
mainly due to decreased production o f agricultural goods. The decreased amount o f  agricultural 
and livestock products expected to reach the market after the losses caused by Hurricane Ivan 
were expected to be compensated by imports from abroad, so that food availability would be 
ensured in the country. Because o f this, sales and profits in the commerce sub-sector were not 
expected to be affected in a significant manner, excepting in the event o f  a delay in import 
arrivals, and no negative impact was expected in its GDP as a result o f  the disaster. Nevertheless, 
supplying the demand o f agriculture and livestock goods in the local markets were expected to 
have an unforeseen impact on the balance o f  payments.
Estimates were made o f this possible effect based on the amounts and prices o f  those 
agriculture and livestock goods that should reach the local markets to satisfy domestic demands, 
and after discounting the amounts o f  said goods that are normally consumed directly by farmers 
without going into the commercial channels. The estimated negative impact on the balance o f  
payments was thus estimated to be about J$ 556 million or its equivalent o f  9 million dollars.
E. Tourism
The gross domestic product o f  the Tourism sector in Jamaica has been rising steadily over the 
past two years, as a result o f  the industry’s recovery from the effects o f  the September 11 attack 
in the United States and o f the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003.
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During the second quarter o f 2004, total visitor arrivals grew by 9.4 %, while stopovers increased 
12.0 % and cruise passenger arrivals by 5.7 %.
The winds o f  the hurricane and the associated storm surge caused severe damage to hotel 
and restaurant infrastructure in the Negril and Treasure Beach tourist areas; other tourist areas 
located in the vicinity o f  Kingston (Strawberry Hill) sustained damage as well. Beaches and coral 
reefs sustained damage due to the action o f  the storm surge that in some places exceeded 3m in 
height. Some cruise ships were diverted from Jamaican ports before the arrival o f  the hurricane.
While the hurricane occurred during a relatively low-occupancy period o f  the year, 
revenue losses could be high depending on the time required for rehabilitation o f  the damaged 
premises. In most cases, however, hotel owners expected to have achieved full infrastructure 
recovery before the start o f  the high tourist season on December 15. Entrepreneurs within the 
sector made every effort not to lay o ff any o f  the skilled employees by resorting to their 
utilization in maintenance and rehabilitation activities, as well as offering advanced annual leave 
to the workers, so that they could be available when the high season started.
Based on information furnished by private entrepreneurs, the total impact o f  the hurricane 
on the sector amounted to $1590.7 million, or its equivalent o f  25.7 million dollars. O f this, 
$466.3 million represented direct damage, and expected losses o f  revenue would amount to 
$1124.4 million. The impact on the external sector was expected to be significant since most o f  
the earnings o f  tourism were derived from foreign visitor expenditures (see Table 6.4).
E s t im a te d  I m p a c t  o f  th e  H u r r ic a n e  o n  th e  T o u r is m  s e c to r  o f  J a m a ic a  
( S M il l io n )
Component Dam age and losses Sector Effect on  
external 
sector
Total Damage Losses Public Private
Total 1,590.7 4663 1.174.4 1.590.7 1,054
Infrastructure 4663
Revenue loss 1.174.4
Source: Estimates made b y  ECLAC on the basis o f  preliminary' private sector information.
F. Infrastructure
Infrastructure was one o f  the main areas that sustained significant direct damage due to wind, 
rainfall and runoff. Destruction and damage to infrastructure, however, was minor compared to 
the indirect effects arising from the temporary absence o f  the services that the population draws 
from the infrastructure. The damages and losses sustained by electricity, water supply and 
telecommunications systems, and by the transport sectors, are described below. However, 
contrary to the case o f  the social and productive sectors, information to evaluate damage and 
losses in the infrastructure sectors were not fully available at the time o f the assessment. Some o f  
the entities that provide some o f  these services were still facing the pressing needs o f  restoring 
their systems and facilities, and were thus unable to provide the information that was required. In
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addition, private enterprises in some sectors engaged consultants to appraise their damage and 
losses with a view to submitting insurance claims, and were also unable to provide information 
that was in the process o f being completed. Therefore, and contrary to what normally happens in 
other countries, the estimation o f damage and losses in infrastructure was less comprehensive and 
of more limited accuracy than those o f  the sectors that have been described in the previous 
sectors.
Electricity and W ater
According to recent data, real GDP for the electricity and water sub-sector grew by 3.8 % 
in the second quarter o f 2004, in comparison with the corresponding period for the previous year. 
This was due to increased production o f both electricity and water. Total electricity generation 
rose in the quarter to 962.5 million KWh, and the production o f water reached a total o f 71240 
mega litres. The hurricane was expected to affect the sector’s performance for the third and 
fourth quarters.
Electricity sector
The Electricity sector sustained damages and losses that, while small in comparison to 
other sectors, had a very significant impact on the functioning o f the entire Jamaican economy. 
Just before the hurricane reached the island, power generation was suspended as a precautionary 
measure. The hurricane’s strong winds affected lower voltage transmission lines through the 
breaking o f poles especially those made out o f  wood, as well as urban distribution grids. 
Electricity supply was interrupted throughout the island. The Jamaica Public Service Company 
Limited (JPSCo.), the private entity entrusted with the provision o f electricity in the island, began 
efforts to restore the transmission and distribution service on a staged basis. Priority was assigned 
to the reconnection o f essential public buildings such as hospitals and water purification, 
production and pumping plants. Depending on the availability o f  road access, JPSCo. began the 
process o f  replacing broken poles and restoring service. Thirty eight days after the disaster, 5 % 
o f users remained without service, especially those located in far away areas where roads were 
still inaccessible or under repair.
The JPSCo. was expected to sustain a decline in revenues due to the interruption o f the 
power supply. In the absence o f  detailed information, an attempt was made to estimate these 
losses and use was made o f the average value o f  revenues in 2003 in combination with the 
information on service recovery performance described above. In addition, the utility company 
incurred unforeseen expenditures -  including both overtime salaries for employees as well as 
transport costs -  for the repairs to the system, which also had an effect on its financial results for 
the year. Again, in the absence o f  itemized information in this respect, order o f  magnitude 
estimations were made o f these losses.
N o estimates were available in regard to the value o f  the damaged or destroyed assets. 
Nevertheless, since the JPS undertook the replacement o f  poles, cable lines and related equipment 
and materials, drawing from its inventories, which were expected to be replenished with imports 
later on, a rough estimate was made on the basis o f  the value o f  those stocks described in the 
company’s 2003 Annual Report. Preliminary estimates indicated that the electrical sub-sector 
sustained total damage and losses o f some $1398 million (or 22.5 million dollars), o f  which $589
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million were direct damages (42 %) and $809 million indirect losses. Imports amounting to $410 
million (or its equivalent o f  6.6 million dollars) would have to be made to replenish the inventory 
of materials and equipment o f the utility.
The damage and losses sustained by the electricity sector were expected to result in losses 
to the sectors and persons that make use o f  electricity as an input for their activities and 
production. Despite the availability o f  emergency generating plants, many activities could not 
begin their reactivation before electricity was restored or while the service was still suffering 
interruptions. These indirect losses were estimated and accounted for in most o f  the sectors 
analyzed in previous chapters. However, the entire stoppage o f  electricity supply for at least one 
day, would have a negative impact on other productive sectors not analyzed in the assessment, 
and would have an additional effect on gross domestic product.
W ater supply and sanitation
Water production and consumption in the first six months o f  2004 was slightly above 
normal, due to a 3.1 % increase in the rural areas. However, as described in the Agricultural 
sector o f  the report, total rainfall was 30.3 % below the 40-year mean. The winds from the 
hurricane produced minor damage to buildings, while flooding and landslides affected water 
intake works, dislocated water mains and blocked access to some critical facilities. The high 
sediment content in river and spring water resulted in very high turbidity levels that could not be 
easily reduced at treatment plants, and some o f them were temporarily taken out o f operation. But 
the most significant factor was the lack o f electricity that impeded the functioning o f key 
components o f  the system, including pumping stations and treatment facilities.
Over 600 electricity-dependent facilities, including sewerage plants, were affected in one 
way or another. While waiting for the restoration o f electrical service, the National Water 
Commission (NWC), under the Ministry o f  Water and Housing, made efforts to bring back into 
service those facilities that could be operated on available standby generators, as well as those 
systems that could be operated through gravity flow distribution. Priority was assigned to 
hospitals and other critical facilities. As electricity flows were restarted and road access to 
facilities was restored, water supply was restored.
Approximately 40 days after the hurricane struck, service had been restored in about 97 % 
o f the entire system. Nevertheless, some locations were still suffering from low water pressure, 
intermittent water supply and even no water, in response to variations in pressure within the 
system. During the initial days o f the crisis, the NWC resorted to distributing water in many 
localities through the use o f tanker trucks, both from its own fleet and renting others from private 
companies. NWC personnel had to work long hours in order to prepare systems for reenergizing, 
to rehabilitate damaged plants, and for emergency distribution o f water. Increased filtering and 
treatment o f  water was made in order to guarantee a minimum quality o f  drinking water. 
Therefore, the utility enterprise suffered from loss o f  revenue and increased operational 
expenditures over the time required for the resumption o f normal activities.
Partial information was available concerning the direct damage sustained by the system. 
Estimates were made o f the losses in revenue that the NWC would sustain, based on the recovery 
o f the service data in combination with the average daily revenue as recorded for 2003.
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Operational cost increases were estimated taking into consideration overtime o f field personnel, 
the cost o f  operation or rental o f  tanker trucks, increased fuel and water filtering and treatment 
costs, on the basis o f information provided in the annual report o f  the NWC and o f the time 
required for recovery o f  the service. It was estimated that the water supply and sanitation sub 
sector sustained total damage and losses o f $578.8 million (US$9.3 million), o f which direct 
damage amounted to $90 million and indirect losses were $488 million. Due to the need to 
import some equipment and materials from abroad, a $134 million (US$2.2 million) negative 
impact was sustained by the external sector.
These damages and losses sustained by the water supply and sanitation sub-sector were 
expected to have an impact on other sectors. In the health sector, for instance, the lack o f water 
created problems in the operation o f hospitals and other facilities and the absence o f  a fully 
reliable quality in the water supply was partly responsible for increased morbidity rates. In 
addition, the temporary absence o f  safe water at homes forced people to resort to purchase bottled 
water for consumption, thus affecting their household budget.
Transport
The hurricane caused a very negative impact on roads and generated revenue losses in the 
international airport in the capital city o f Kingston.
Road transport
The heavy rains produced by hurricane Ivan and the ensuing floods, land and mud slides 
inflicted a heavy toll on the road network o f the island, including both main roads maintained by 
the National Works Agency (NWA) and by Parish councils. The storm surge caused heavy 
damage to the highway connecting Kingston and Norman Manley international airport.
Floods and landslides cut o ff entire sections o f  roads; blocked and destroyed drains and 
culverts; damaged and destroyed retaining walls and bridge approaches; and breached riverbanks 
and deposited silt on river channels. As result o f  saturated soils, heavy rainfall and the eroding 
action o f river and streams, slippage o f  entire sections o f  roads occurred. High river stages and 
floods scoured river channels and adjacent roads and related works. Roadway carpeting was 
badly damaged and many o f the major arterial roads sustained damage.
Rehabilitation efforts o f  the NW A concentrated on clearing the roads to ensure at least 
single-lane traffic, which was achieved by September 30, 2004. Direct damage to the road system 
included the cost o f  removing landslide material, repairing and reconstruction o f drainage and 
ancillary structures, repair and reconstruction o f entire sections o f different types o f  roads, and 
the resurfacing o f many roads. In addition, many vehicles were carried away or destroyed by 
floods.
Indirect losses included the temporary interruption o f passenger and cargo traffic in the 
road network for three to five days, the slower than normal traffic in single lane roads, the use of  
alternative and lower quality roads, and the increased transport cost due to deterioration o f road 
surfaces. No information on the volumes o f  traffic for the affected roads, or on the increased unit 
transport costs in the case o f  lower quality road surfaces was available at the time o f the
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assessment. Therefore, it was not possible to undertake even an order-of-magnitude estimation o f  
these indirect effects (anticipated to be very high in monetary terms) that would have a negative 
bearing on the population’s well-being. The costs o f river training to protect the roads from future 
damages were estimated as indirect losses. Therefore, the total effect o f  the disaster on the road 
transport sector was estimated as $3199 (51.6 million dollars), o f  which $2403 million refered to 
direct damage and the remaining $796million represented the underestimated value o f  indirect 
losses. Imported equipment and materials for the sector were expected to have an estimated 
impact o f  $1280 million or its equivalent o f 20.6 million dollars.
Airports
The passage o f  the hurricane forced the closure for a period o f three days o f Norman 
Manley airport in Kingston and o f  Donald Sangster airport in Montego Bay, which handle 
international air passenger and cargo transport. Winds damaged roofing in the cargo areas in the 
runway lighting system, and broke windows at the Norman Manley airport. In addition, several 
light planes were swept away and turned over by the winds. Operations were resumed after clean­
up operations had been completed at both airports. Nevertheless, there occurred losses o f  revenue 
that affected financial operations.
These included the decline in passenger service, landing, security, car parking service, 
and airport improvement fees, as well as income from concessionaires established at the airports. 
The total impact o f  the disaster on the sub-sector was estimated at $60 million, o f  which $47 
million were direct damages and $13.1 refered to indirect losses. The airport and airplane owners 
had insurance covering those damage and losses.
Telecomm unications
The Telecommunications sub-sector sustained significant physical plant damage and 
operational losses. Detailed assessments were carried out, as required by the insurance 
companies, before reimbursements could be made. Nevertheless, order o f  magnitude estimates 
were developed.
The telephone exchange building and equipment located in two locations in central 
Jamaica were flooded and the service was turned off, which left the St. Elizabeth, Santa Cruz and 
other neighbouring parishes without telephone communications. The submarine fibre optic cable 
that links the island with the United States, through which nearly 80 % o f the traffic, (including 
Internet) is routed, was severed in its land section in the Cayman Islands. Traffic was re-routed 
through satellites but service remained at below standard levels for some time.
Cell phone services sustained damage as antennas were turned out o f  alignment by the 
strong winds o f  the hurricane. The lack o f electricity made it necessary for the utilities to resort to 
use o f  standby diesel generators and many users were unable to use their phones as they lacked 
capacity to recharge their units. The utilities incurred increased operational costs and this resulted 
in lower revenues over the period o f recovery, which lasted from between one to two months.
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Based on partial information available, it was estimated that the cost o f  direct damage to 
the Telecommunications sector was $198.6 million, as required for the repairs and reconstruction 
of the assets. Scant information available for two o f the utilities indicated that indirect losses 
would be around $1336.7 million. The total amount o f the impact o f  the hurricane on the sector 
was expected to reach $1535 million.
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NATIONAL DISASTER PLANS OF JAM AICA
The National Disaster Plan is comprised o f several volumes as listed below:
• National Hurricane Plan
• National Earthquake Plan
• National Emergency Operations Centre Procedures
• National Drought Management Plan
• National Plan for Riots and Civil Unrest
• National Fire Plan
• National Aircraft Crash Plan
• National Transportation Plan
• National Communications Plan
• Management o f Incoming Personnel Plan
• Welfare and Relief Assistance Management Plan
• Management o f  International Assistance
• Procedures for Donating Assistance to Countries Affected by Disaster
• Recovery Plan
• National Oil and Hazardous Materials Spill Plan
• National Mass Casualty Plan
• Parish Disaster Plans
• Major Epidemic Plan
• National Animal Diseases Plan
• National Damage Assessment Plan
• National Media Plan
In addition, The Jamaica Constabulary Force, Fire Brigade and Jamaica Defence Force have 
orders which detail their response procedures. Major hospitals also develop disaster plans, as do 
Ministries and Agencies involved in the national response team.
Finally, there is a Portmore Evacuation Plan, which has been developed to aid this large 
urban community in the advent o f  a major hurricane or earthquake event.
Appendix III
